

PARALLEL SYSTEMIC PRINCIPLES

in

SAUSSUREAN LINGUISTICS

and in

ADLERIAN PSYCHOLOGY



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SAUSSUREAN LINGUISTICS and ADLERIAN PSYCHOLOGY
TWO SYSTEMIC MODELS

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Introduction

This paper has two purposes:

1. To clarify the relation of Alfred Adler's thinking to the central trend in European Human Studies since the late 19th century: Structuralism. This I propose to do both for history of science's sake and for my personal interest in the two.
2. To examine central issues in one of the best formulated and formalized human sciences--linguistics--in order to derive some benefit for Adlerian Psychology.

I shall start by a short historical perspective and go on to some principles of Saussurean and post-Saussurean structural linguistics, briefly compared with their Adlerian counterparts, as formulated by Adler himself and by later Adlerians. More space will be given to explaining the linguistic side of the principles involved, assuming that the reader of this paper has better knowledge of Adlerian Psychology than of Saussurean linguistics. The discussion will sometimes become somewhat repetitive, as both disciplines, being holistic, invariably lead to the same central issues, no matter where one starts.

Among the principles discussed, an Adlerian might miss that of teleology. The reason is simple--language is a social code agreed upon in a community. It is a system, but not an organism. As W. Humboldt once wrote, it is an enérgeia ("activity"), not an érgon ("deed, thing"). It thus can have no purpose in its development or action, no direction except the one dictated by

its user. Therefore, teleology is one principle that has very rarely been applied to its workings, at least in modern times. This lack is significant the way zero-elements (See Sec. 5.3) are relevant in their subsystems: it is one of the differentiae specificae between language and psyche.

In discussing these two spheres, I shall most often compare the understanding of an individual person with that of an individual language. Occasionally I shall discuss the systems within the language or the person, and sometimes the larger hierarchy wherein each of them is situated (e.g., ^{cf. p 20)} in a family, in a family of languages, etc.). I shall use italics (underlined letters) to cite linguistic forms or scientific terms as they are used; quotation marks will show the meaning of the form or the term: dog means "dog".

0. Historical Perspective

In the history of the science of man, some of the very basic ideas recur in a cycle. They appear, become dominant in the contemporary model of man, then lose importance and are replaced by their antitheses. Seen this way, a model of thought about man at any given time is a confluence of such ideas as happen to be in fashion at the moment. Alfred Adler's psychology is no exception. It is interesting to try and locate his thinking in the incessant cycles of ideas. More specifically, I would like to look into the parallel development of his theories and those by the famous Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), that revolutionized European Traditional Grammar. Saussure's influence was not due to his few published works, but to a "course in general linguistics" that he taught in the University of Geneva in the years 1907, 1908, and 1911. Notes taken from these lectures were edited by some of his disciples, published and soon changed the familiar aspect of European linguistics, which used to deal with comparison of languages and with their history, or with prescriptive school grammar.

American linguistics may have been indirectly influenced by Saussure, as some eminent Americans, such as Leonard Bloomfield, studied in Europe. Some tried to introduce Saussure's work to the American linguists (Wells, 1947; Waterman, 1956), but with no great success. The Course was not translated into English until 1959, and then it did have some repercussions. But by then the American brand of structuralism was grown and ramified; in fact, it started showing some signs of ossification, which prepared the scene

for the appearance of its traditional rationalist opponent in a new guise: Transformational-Generative Grammar, by N. Chomsky (See Sec. 9.1).

0.1. Saussure and Durkheim

One important source of influence that was apparently at work on Saussure's thinking was that of the ideas, very much in fashion toward the turn of the century, of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). The main themes were non-historical explanation of events, a central, constant core in a system that guides it, and in general the importance of the fait social, or "socialness" (Hale, 1976; Bierbach).

It is not known whether Saussure actually read Durkheim, or had some indirect contact with his ideas. Yet in that "world of yesterday", it would be unthinkable to assume the existence of such close ideas without any connection. For Saussure's life and career, see Culler (1977) and Koerner (1973).

0.2. Adler and Durkheim

Now Adler has some ideas that resemble much those of Saussure. Among them are those just mentioned which were attributed to Durkheim. Adler lived farther off from the French speaking center of the Sorbonne, yet in his case too there could be either direct influence (Durkheim was translated into German starting at 1900), or indirect. His biographers (Bottome, 1939; Orgler, 1939; Sperber, 1926; Rom, 1966) refer to his interest in sociology and social questions but do not mention details. Ansbacher (1973) has tried to summarize Adler's relations with social scientists. He shows

that Adler knew the writings of quite a few of the main social thinkers known at his time, mostly Germans. One French name, however, is mentioned: Henri Bergson, a contemporary (1859-1941) of Saussure and Durkheim. Ansbacher (1959) also compared Durkheim's anomie with Adler's lack of social interest. About their relationship he says:

It appears altogether likely that Adler, by 12 years his junior, was influenced by Durkheim, although probably indirectly, since Adler does not refer to Durkheim (pp. 212-213).

Regarding Durkheim there is no lead at all from Adler to him, although there are many similarities (Ansbacher, 1983).

To Ansbacher's notes I would like to add here a recurring issue in Durkheim's work, first mentioned in his doctoral thesis, De la division du travail social (1893, English 1933), as presented mainly by Giddens (1979).

As we approach modern times, the type of social cohesion which Durkheim called mechanical solidarity, based on an embracing moral consensus, is increasingly displaced by a second type, organic solidarity. This is a form of cohesion based indeed on relationships of exchange, within a differentiated division of labor. But it cannot be understood as the natural outcome of "utilitarian" self-interest. Rather, it expresses the emergence of new moral precepts: "Cooperation," Durkheim stressed, "has its intrinsic morality" (1933, p. 228).

In essence, this is the same as Adler's social interest or cooperation, or what Dreikurs later also referred to as democracy and equality. Durkheim was very interested in the relation between history, moral authority and human freedom. For him, just as for Adler, "freedom consists, not in escape from social forces and social bonds, but in the autonomy of action that membership in society makes possible" (Giddens, 1979, p. 35).

This brings us to the basic question of the place of values in the human sciences. Durkheim taught expressly that our understanding of society in different stages of its development is wrought with our values, and with the way we understand the values of that specific stage itself. He stressed values as necessary for understanding general development as well as specific phenomena, like suicide (Durkheim, 1897; English 1951).

For example, Durkheim strongly distinguished between socialism and communism. The former was for him the essence of "organic solidarity", and he likened it, with "moral individualism", to a form of religion. Socialism was a specific economic response to the European crisis, in the form of centralizing economy in the hands of directive institutions. Communism, on the other hand, was for Durkheim a general, all-time trend of man to dream up utopias. It was essentially a moral doctrine based on "mechanical solidarity" and which identifies private property as the origin of evil. Communism is afraid of the corrupting force of wealth; socialism aspires to expand production to create more wealth for all.

All this reminds us of the central place of values in Adler's understanding of man. We also know enough about Adler's positive view of socialist and democratic ideas (1978, 7; 313) and of the close compatibility of his stand, unknowingly, with that of the young Marx (Adler, 1973, p. 32ff), to appreciate his similarity to Durkheim. As is known, Adler, too, rejected communism explicitly (1973, p. 314).

A final point of similarity is finalism. Durkheim used function for the social outcome that the intentions or purposes of individuals bring about: people go to church to worship God, but the function of their activity is to enhance social unity. By contrast, for him causal explanation

involves the identification of laws which explain the succession of social phenomena. It is thus a historic perspective.

This distinction, although quite cursory in Durkheim, has been remarkably influential (Giddens, 1979, p. 44ff).

As we know, in a way Adler too identified, in the individual, purpose with outcome, taking the latter as proof of the former. And the distinction from historical cause is the same as Durkheim's.

The influence by Durkheim cannot be proved for either Saussure or Adler, as we saw. Yet this does not carry so much importance. What counts in the world of ideas is the ideas themselves, which we shall continue to discuss in the next sections.

1. Arbitrary sign. Relativism. Typology.

Linguistic Principles

For Saussure, language is a system of signs (1959, p. 65ff). Signs are "noises" that communicate "ideas". In order to do that, they must be a part of a system of conventions that relates noises to ideas. Saussure's term for the "noise" is signifiant (English "signifier", but I shall sometimes use the French term, following a long tradition): the "idea" is called signifié ("signified") and their combination is the signe ("sign"). It is important to note that a signifiant without its signifié is just a sound conglomerate, a noise, a non-linguistic phenomenon. A signifié without its signifiant is again a non-linguistic, philosophical concept. Only their combination forms the subject matter of linguistics. The essential quality of the sign is its arbitrariness: there is no natural or inevitable link between the signifier and the signified. Horse is no better sound-chain than cheval to designate the idea of "horse". (It is true that some onomatopoeic words and some interjections seem to be exceptions to that law. But these are isolated classes, limited to imitating natural sounds; moreover they change with time and differ from one language to another--hence are partially arbitrary too--from the moment they are incorporated in a certain language.)

All this may be interesting enough but not really revolutionary. Also, it is relevant to sign systems ("semiotic" ones) only, those that make communication possible. What is the connection to psychology? Some relevance

to psychological systems might be through the notion of communication inside those systems (e.g., in the family) and among them (e.g., among individuals). Although some recent writers--possibly Palo Alto School people such as Don Jackson, Jay Haley, Virginia Satir and others--will declare the subject matter of psychology to be communication alone, Adler would not have been one of them. Before we discuss psychology any further, let us look a little deeper into the nature of language: What is more far reaching in Saussure's idea of the arbitrary sign is his contention that languages are not nomenclatures, i.e., lists of different names for the same objects or concepts. If languages had this universal conceptual grid, translation and language-learning would be simple, semi-automatic operations. It may indeed be so in the case of a few "ubiquitous" animals such as the horse, cow, dog, etc.; with some kinship terms (mother, father, son, etc.) or body-parts. But even those are not really always directly translatable: languages like German have a few names for English horse (Pferd, Ross, Gaul, etc.). Modern Hebrew, imitating Yiddish and Slavic languages, has only one word, régel, for both English "foot" and "leg". With less ubiquitous concepts, even within our well-known Western Civilization, fitness between languages is coincidental: French aimer is both English "love" and "like", whereas English know covers French "connaître" and "savoir", as English go fits both German "fahren" and "gehen" (and more). Perhaps the most famous example is that of color names, which very often escape exact translating, as from English to Welsh:

English	Welsh
green	gwyrd
blue	glas
gray	
brown	llwyd

(See also, Hjelmslev, 1961, p. 53; Culler, 1976, pp. 10-22.) Jacobs (1958, p. 14) describes well the different aspects of the "bat" that have motivated his names in many languages; but then he goes on to ascribe to his Adam's naming of the animal the Platonic "ideal imitation", as if the sound of a name was not wholly arbitrary (p. 17ff).

A historic corroboration of arbitrariness is that, if concepts were fixed and universal, historic change would not have affected meaning at all. Yet we know that Old English hlaeford, "dough-warden", has changed to mean "lord"; hlaefdige, "dough-kneader" now denotes "lady"; and silly used to mean "happy, blessed, pious." There is no such thing as constancy of meaning.

On the other hand, let us not assume that linguistic arbitrariness and idiosyncrasy occur on the level of the signified alone. The sounds of a language are no less subject to choice. Each language uses just a fraction of all the possible articulations, both in vowels and in consonants, and rejects the others, just as Welsh has chosen a certain color list (above) and rejects the other possibilities. The familiar Roman Alphabet used for so many languages (but not all) serves to hide this fact, for it employs the same letter, e.g. l, to denote for example German "tense" l and both English back l (as in all) and front l (in lean, etc.). And again, as with meanings, phonetic traits of a language change very drastically with time.

An additional trait of language is that no side of the sign--neither signifier nor signified--are drawn from reality, but are already abstractions from it. Saussure (1959, pp. 11, 66) says they are both "psychological". The signifier of a certain sign, e.g., dog, is not a sound chain per se, but an "image" of a sound chain, with as many realizations as there are people speaking that language, with different voices, intonations and

pronunciations. Its signified too is an abstract idea of the concept of "dog", common to all speakers in the same culture and to all the kinds of dogs that they know. This led Saussure to his famous dictum: "Language is form, not substance" (1959, pp. 113, 122).

All this leads us to conclude that linguistic signs are never universal, neither in their signifiers nor in their signifieds. Yet this simple truth is easy to forget (Saussure, 1959, p. 68). Philosophers, logicians and other rationalist-minded thinkers tend to overlook it, even when they admit it. The whole modern transformationalist-generative movement (Chomsky, 1957, etc.) is admittedly based on a rationalistic search for universals (no longer on the example of Latin, as in the medieval modistae or in the Grammaire de Port Royal (1660)--today English is the language of logic because of its belief in "innate ideas" (Robins, 1968, pp. 86ff, 100-130, and below, Sec. 9.1.1.)

Paradoxically, there is only one trait of the sign which is universal. This is the very fact that each language creates its own world of signifiers and signifieds by arbitrarily dividing the two continua, and then combines these creations, or better, holds them relatively fixed by their very combination. We shall call this paradox linguistic relativism. In the United States this view is connected with the name of B. Whorf. (Whorf maintained in addition that only the language determines thinking, not vice versa. Saussure did not take such a stand.)

All other really universal traits of language that we might think of pertain to its very definition and will, therefore, be rather trivial; for example, that language communicates, that language says something (A) about something else (B), etc.

1.2 Psychological Correlates

Where is the connection with Adler? In the notion of relativity, derived from arbitrariness.

Besides the very basic generalizations about the nature of man and his motivation--socialness, whence both striving for superiority, and social interest--Adler's description of a person is idiographic, relativistic. Note the Adlerian relativism in interpreting symbols in dreams in Dreikurs (1967, p. 222) and Mosak (1977, pp. 55-59, 9-11). Similarities in heredity and environment might influence people towards forming similar life styles, but are no more than probable influences, and no two styles of life are identical. As in languages, the only universal trait with life styles is that every individual does construct one out of the infinite possibilities at his or her disposal to fit the situation, like someone introduced into the middle of a second act of a play and having to adopt some role (Powers, 1973, p. 275).

This brings us to the description of similarities, both among languages and individuals. This is mostly done through typologies, such as the conventional psychiatric diagnosis or, among Adlerians, Mosak's types (1977, pp. 183-187) or Kefir's Priorities (Dinkmeyer, Pew, & Dinkmeyer, 1979, p. 82). In linguistics this is a never ceasing pastime, too (Finck; Greenberg, 1966). Yet typology can never be more than a partial resemblance, given the relativistic tenet. The great question is always, what part(s) to choose for comparison. Psychologists may justify their choice of a basis for typology by its practical importance, e.g., basic motivation, recurrent symptoms, etc.

Still, every typology is subjective and must, by definition, leave out the bulk of idiographic information, thus doing wrong to scientific description on the basis of a personally-preferred criterion. Linguistic typology suffers from the same generalizing, negligent tendencies, and does not even have the practical consideration. Saussure had in mind some of these when he objected to typology (1959, 228-232). For a tried refutation of typology, see also Barri (1981).

2. The Whole and its Parts: Hierarchies and Systems of Values

2.1.1. Values in Language

We have seen that languages are not nomenclatures for a universal grid of concepts, and that each language has to "throw its net" to imprint the forms of its world-view on the phonic or semantic substance.

Let us pursue the question further: we know that voices differ and the a of the signifier of the name Nancy in English may be pronounced by different English speakers and even by the same person as [æ], [ɛ], [a], [ɑ], [éa], or even [íá] ([Níancy]). The vowel written a thus covers a whole family of sounds. We know, too, that the signified "table" is a summation, an abstraction, of all the tables, small and big, wooden or not, etc., that we have seen. If it is not the simple substance of the sounds or ideas that lets us identify a sign, what does identify it? What makes Nancy recognizable? What permits us to conceptualize a "table" when we hear table? Or what is it that enables us to use the names of the colors if no physical property of the spectrum (a wave length) is reliably associated with any one color name? Saussure's answer is that the abstractions that the language makes from the available substances constitute different sub-systems made up of units identifiable by their relative values, or relations with one another:

Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find in all the foregoing examples values emanating from the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not (Saussure, 1959, p. 117).

In terms of our examples, this means that Nancy stays recognizable as long as voice alterations and pronunciation variations have not confused its a, however realized, with another vowel or diphthong, e.g., o, i, or ei. Similarly, we are safe in communicating the idea of "table", however pictured, as long as we do not speak of a furniture-piece for sitting on ("chair") or a climbing instrument ("ladder") or thelike. With colors, Welsh glas denotes that wide range of green-through-blue-to-gray (wide only for English speakers!) as long as we do not use the neighboring signifiers. For a Welsh, the nuances within his glas have no value. They are "shades of glas", like our "shades of blue".

Saussure's (1959) analogies for relational identity are instructive:

For instance, we speak of the identity of two "8:25 p.m. Geneva-to-Paris" trains that leave at twenty-four hour interval. We feel that it is the same train each day, yet everything - the locomotive, coaches, personnel - is probably different. Or if a street is demolished, then rebuilt, we say that it is the same street even though in a material sense, perhaps nothing of the old one remains. Why can a street be completely rebuilt and still be the same? Because it does not constitute a purely material entity; it is based on certain conditions that are distinct from the materials that fit the conditions, e.g. its location with respect to other streets. Similarly, what makes the express is its hour of departure, its route, and in general every circumstance that sets it apart from other trains (pp. 108-109).

Another analogy which Saussure uses to illustrate the notion of relational identity is the comparison between language and chess. The basic units of chess are obviously king, queen, rook, knight, bishop, and pawn. The actual physical shape of the pieces and the material from which they are made is of no importance. The king may be of any size and shape, as long as there are ways of distinguishing it from other pieces. Moreover, the two rooks need not be of identical size and shape, so long as they can be distinguished

from other pieces. Thus, as Saussure points out, if a piece is lost from a chess set, we can replace it with any other sort of object, provided always that this object will not be confused with the objects representing pieces of a different value (Saussure, 1959, pp. 110, 153-54). The actual physical properties of pieces are of no importance, so long as there are differences of some kind, any kind will do, between pieces which have different value.

Thus, one can say that the units of the game of chess have no material identity: there are no physical properties necessary to a king or a pawn. Identity is wholly a function of differences within a system. If we now apply the analogy to language we shall be in a position to understand Saussure's paradoxical claim that in the system of a language "there are only differences, with no positive terms" (Saussure, 1959, pp. 120, 166). Needless to say, values exist only in the system of the language where they belong. They make up that system and are defined by it.

2.1.2. Use as Value in Adler

In psychology, relational identity or value reminds us of Adler's psychology of use, as opposed to possessions or traits: No part of an individual psychological set-up is an entity or trait with an independent identity. A person uses what he has in accordance with a general principle and with his other "uses" and capacities, or makes up what he needs. Only in view of the whole life style can one understand or "give name" to any part-function (Adler, 1964, pp. 204-238). As in language, use gives form to a substance, which in the individual is heredity and environment. Adler's

commitment to relations is seen in his statement that to understand is "to recognize the relationship between things" (Adler, 1964, p. 14).

2.2.1. Systems of Language: Relations, Hierarchy

Language has traditionally been considered a system, things that "are put or stand together" (Greek syn- "together"; ste- "stand", "be put"; -ma, a concrete noun suffix). It was Saussure that gave it the modern, gestaltist or field-theory meaning: "In semiological systems like language, where elements hold each other in equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, the notion of identity blends with that of value and vice versa" (1959, p. 110; *italics mine*, N.B.). Here both the elements and their system define each other by their relations, as in the game of chess. Hjelmslev (1961) pushed this idea to its logical limit:

Naive realism would probably suppose that analysis consisted merely in dividing a given object into parts, i.e., into other objects, then those again into parts, i.e., into still other objects, and so on. But even naive realism would be faced with the choice between several possible ways of dividing. It soon becomes apparent that the important thing is not the division of an object into parts, but the conduct of the analysis so that it conforms to the mutual dependences between these parts, and permits us to give an adequate account of them. In this way alone the analysis becomes adequate and, from the point of view of a metaphysical theory of knowledge, can be said to reflect the "nature" of the object and its parts.

When we draw the full consequences from this, we reach a conclusion which is most important for an understanding of the principle of analysis: both the object under examination and its parts have existence only by virtue of these dependences; the whole of the object under examination can be defined only by their sum total; and each of its parts can be defined only by the dependences joining it to other coordinated parts, to the whole, and to its parts of the next degree, and by the sum of the dependences that these parts of the next degree contract with each other. After we have recognized this, the "objects" of naive realism are, from our point of view, nothing but intersections of bundles of such dependences. That is to say, objects can be described

only with their help and can be defined and grasped scientifically only in this way. The dependences, which naive realism regards as secondary, presupposing the objects, become from this point of view primary, presupposed by their intersections (pp. 22-23).

For the use of this view in actual analysis, see Barri (1975, 1978).

2.2.2. Indivisibility of System in Adler. Person in Society

Adler's counterpart of this gestaltist position is his famous indivisibility of man, or holism (Adler, 1964, pp. 94ff), where he explicitly likens his notion with the Gestalt one (pp. 114ff). Now we should take indivisibility with a grain of salt: concerning the individual's motivation and movement, no division is feasible. But the uses a person makes of his or her parts can be viewed singly, as long as their subservient nature toward the whole is kept in mind.

In a sense, Adler's self or whole person constitutes a field, where the different functions of the individual are arranged in a hierarchy of uses. On the other hand, humans are only a part of their social environment, which thus constitutes the field. This idea was explicitly formulated in Family Therapy Theory, one of the most compatible with Adlerian thinking. In an impressive chapter on "The concept of the system" in Napier and Whitaker's (1978) The Family Crucible, we find the following hierarchy of ^{man}people and the hierarchical systems above and below them (1978, pp. 49-50):

An interesting aspect of systems is that they are organized hierarchically. For example, one can look at the individual person as a system. As one looks "down" from the level of his system, one sees that it includes a number of subsystems in a decreasing order of size and complexity:

PERSON OR ORGANISM

organ system

organ

cell

atom

atomic particle

Of course, one need not stop with that hierarchy. One can look "upward" into still more complex systems which influence the individual person. Just focusing on some of the other human systems to which the individual is related expands the chain of influence considerably:

world ~~comm~~unity of nations

national alliance

nation

state

country

city or ~~comm~~unity~~community~~ subgroup (work, friendship)

extended family

nuclear family

PERSON OR ORGANISM

organ system

organ

cell

molecule

atom

atomic particle

Napier and Whitaker's hierarchy is an almost exact counterpart of Hjelmslev's hierarchy or stages of descending analysis (below, Sec. 7.1). For him, the traditional units of linguistic description, sentence and word, are but a middle link in a vast hierarchy beginning in the bulk of all the existing texts of all languages and going down to the individual language, period, author, book, chapter, paragraph, then sentence and its parts, down to the minimal units of sound (1961, p. 98f.). Here structural linguistics and systemic psychology have independently arrived at the same notion of hierarchy.

Incidentally, this thesis mostly compares Adler's view of the individual with the Saussurean picture of a language. But since they are both parts of hierarchies, nothing prevents us from comparing a person to a sentence of a language, when this seems fruitful.

b

3. Langue and Parole: Movement by Convention

3.1 Saussure's Langue vs. Parole

The distinction between formal values in a system and their underlying substance, ultimately based on the arbitrariness of the sign, brings us to Saussure's famous dichotomy between langue and parole (translated as "language" and "speaking" in the 1959 Course, but traditionally kept in their French forms by most English and German writers).

Langue is language as a system of forms, whereas parole is actual speech acts, the substance of language, the text, oral or other. The dichotomy is generally thought to have its source in Durkheim's concepts of "fait social" and "contrainte sociale" (Durkheim, 1895), since for Saussure langue is a social fact -- a social use of material objects which constitute the parole. It is a system of conventions, which, being conventions, are perforce social, not individual. The principle is the same as behind the conventional arbitrariness of the sign:

The arbitrary nature of the sign explains in turn why the social fact alone can create a linguistic system. The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are to be set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value (Saussure, 1959, p. 113).

In contrast, parole is the "executive side of language...the psychophysical mechanisms which permit him to externalize these combinations...

In separating langue from parole we are separating what is social from what is individual and what is essential from what is ancillary or accidental (Saussure, 1959, p. 14).

Durkheim's direct influence was sometimes contested (Koerner, 1973, pp. 45-66) but all admit that Saussure's thinking reflects the intellectual climate of the turn of the century, at least in France, where sociology became a popular science, growing out of Auguste Comte's Cours de philosophie positive (1830) and launched by Durkheim, starting in 1895, as a separate science.

For linguistics this was a new idea, delimiting anew its subject: only langue was, for Saussure, the proper matter for linguistic science; parole will belong to phonetics, psychophysics, and other disciplines.

As we saw, according to Saussure, the langue is the "inner", essential, systemic code, and is a socially common property of all members of a speech community. This abstraction is easily recognized as necessary, the moment we hear people speaking a foreign language, which for us is just parole, the "outer", accessory, non-systemic part. It is specific to the individual (note differences in voice, speed, hoarseness, etc., among people), and has a "physical" nature.

Langue is also distinct from parole in that it is retained even after years of silence, and it can be studied through different paroles, as in extinct languages that are handed down by writing of some sort (e.g., pictograms). It is superordinate to parole. As stated by Saussure (1959):

Consider, for example, the productions of sounds necessary for speaking. The vocal organs are as external to language as are the electric devices used in transmitting the Morse code to the code itself; and phonation, i.e., the execution of sound images, in no way affects the system itself. Language is comparable to a symphony in that what the symphony actually is stands completely apart from how it is performed; the mistakes that musicians make in playing the symphony do not compromise that fact.

Doubtless the two objects are closely connected, each depending on the other: language is necessary if speaking is to be intelligible... but speaking is necessary for the establishment of language, and

historically its actuality always comes first....We learn our mother language by listening to others; only after countless experiences is it deposited in our brain....Language and speaking are then interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product of the latter. But their interdependence does not prevent their being two absolutely distinct things (pp. 18-19).

3.2 Life Style and Behavior

From the point of view of psychology, the most interesting aspect here is the equivalent to Aristotle's formal cause, "the ordering or patterning that leads to specific results" (Shulman, 1973, p. 18). Langue is seen as the finite, constant code that is responsible for the infinite amount of linguistic behavior or text. It is what Adler's life style is to the person's behavior: a code responsible for it and giving it sense. "Life style provides the permanence and continuity of personality; the integration of the individual with his environment accounts for the variability of behavior" (Dreikurs-Ferguson, 1964, p. 403). It is thus a constant system governing movement, the "behavior-text". The socialness of the langue, its being shared by a whole community, is comparable to the life style being "shared" by the whole person -- Adlerian holism.

The idea of an inner system is not new in "dynamic" psychology. It was excluded from Behaviorism in its rigid period but it is now crawling back under names like "social learning" and "cognitive psychology", and associated with "broad spectrum behavior therapy" by Bandura, Lazarus, and others (Ellis, 1973). It was novel in linguistics in Saussure's time, and it is still contested by some, in spite of the universal acclaim it has gained. Yet language, as an institution or product of man, is open for more objective


investigation than man himself, Since its socialness gives it the necessary constancy across individuals. Psychologists might profit by reading the (admittedly difficult) work by the famous successor of Saussure, the Dane, Louis Hjelmslev (Danish 1943; English 1961). He constructed a magnificent edifice of double terminology for langue (his "code" or "system") and for parole (which he calls "text" or "process"), considering every linguistic relation now as the one, now as the other.

4. Synchrony vs. Diachrony: The Place of History

4.1 Saussure's Synchrony

In what is perhaps the most well-known of his dichotomies, Saussure distinguished between synchronic linguistics and diachronic one. The former is a discussion of any one stage or moment in the history of a language, described as it stands at that certain moment. The phenomena described coexist: they exist simultaneously one beside the other within the system of the same language.

Diachrony (dia="through", chronos="time") is the historical process (or its description) by which one stage of a language follows another. Its phenomena succeed each other in time; they never coexist. Saussure used this "cross" of coordinates to concretize this:



As he pointed out, all other sciences needed the same distinction, although most of them had not yet recognized it: astronomy, geology, law, etc. Interestingly for Saussure, political economy and economic history did constitute two disciplines in his time, explainable by economy being a science of relative values, not of entities, hence similar to linguistics (Saussure, 1959, pp. 79ff).

Saussure taught also that synchronic investigation by definition precedes diachronic one, for you have to have investigated at least two stages of language before you can appreciate the changes that occurred on the way from the one to the other.

Actually the requirement for stopping the time factor was only one, the first of its kind, in a series of scientific requirements that are nothing else than the experimental postulate, well-known in the natural sciences, about one independent variable and one dependent one, keeping constant all other potential independent variables. Linguistic research, to me, is a special kind of experiment in which the independent variable is the whole system of one stage of a language; the dependent one is the text related to that system. Besides keeping historical changes from distorting the picture we get of the system, we now require that no dialect variable will intervene in the results, nor style variable (Barri, 1978), sometimes not even age or sex variables (in some communities older people or women speak differently, by tradition). We meet these requirements by investigating a text which is homogeneous in source and character.

Saussure compared language to a chess game (1959, pp. 88, 110), because both are systems in which the values of the pieces depend on their positions and on the other pieces in the same field; in both the system is momentary, varying with any one move; any particular position is free from all antecedent positions--the route used in arriving there makes no difference, and spectators who followed the game from the beginning have no advantage over a passerby who comes up to inspect the game at some moment. All this sharpens the distinction between synchrony and diachrony.

As already shown (Sec. 1.1), synchronicity is actually necessitated by the very arbitrariness of the linguistic sign: the fact that the sign is arbitrary, both in the link between the signifier and the signified and as to its relative value, makes it subject to diachronic change. Had there been some essential or natural connection between signifier and signified, then the sign would have a constancy unaffected by time. And yet we know how irretrievably signs are subject to historic change. As brief examples let me mention the sound change in Latin calidus → French chaud "hot", and the meaning change in Old English thing "discussion" (cf. the words for "parliament", in Iceland: Althing; in Denmark: Folketing, etc.) → Modern English thing.

Now this is all the more reason to require an ahistorical analysis of the sign: since it has no necessary core that persists, the only way to define it is as a relational entity, in its relations to other signs, obtaining at a particular time in a language, according to "the momentary arrangement of its terms" (Saussure, 1959, p. 80).

4.1.1. Synchronic Systems are Closed

I may add that the very fact of the systemicity of language requires synchronic research. One necessary axiom about systems is that they must, at any given moment, be regarded as closed (see also below, Sec. 9.1.3; Barri, 1977, p. 33n. 13). Even systems that seem open, e.g., the family (Minuchin, 1974, chap. 3; Satir, 1972, chap. 8) become open only diachronically, i.e., with some new events in their history, and introduce new input into the system. Yet once this input is received, the system continues to work as closed. Closedness

is required by the essence of a system: a system-part defines all other parts and its system, and is in turn defined by them. There is no way this can be done with an indefinite, open number of parts. For example, a child in a family, at a certain time, is the last-born. The child is defined as "a child" by the existence of parents, and as last-born by the older siblings. Synchronically, this family behaves as a closed system, until a diachronic event, such as the birth of a new child, changes it into another system. If one considers a family an open system synchronically, there is no way of deciding how many children it has at a certain moment, let alone finding out who is the last!

Since language does change, it is an "openable" system; this is all the more reason to "immobilize" it in order to describe it "between changes". Yet Saussure's demand for synchronic description was and still is met with some opposition. In his day, linguistics was a proclaimed historic discipline. To this day, many people see linguistic's worthiest achievements in that field, which is certainly the best known to laypersons.

4.1.2. Historicism in Science

Historicism is an issue with all sciences (even those which are not aware of it yet). Part of the tendency to equate knowledge with history stems from the name given to the famous book by Herodotus, Historiae, which in Greek means "inquiries, information" (from the root (h)id-, Latin vid-, "to see"). Herodotus' writings constitute mostly synchronic ethnographic descriptions of the peoples he visited, with just some historical background. But the name, Historia, was subsequently taken over by other Greek and then Roman

writers, to designate their inquiries into the unfolding of their cities, as well as for every other kind of inquiry, natural, physical or geographic. Thus we have to this day "natural history", "history of art", etc., for what are largely synchronic disciplines. This confusion of terms, together with human love for causality, gives history in science its honored, quasi-obligatory place.

4.2 Ahistoricism in Psychology

For a psychologist it is never superfluous to be reminded of the necessary separation between the study of how a person has become the way that he or she is -- developmental psychology -- and his synchronic, actual build. Freudians are notorious for not having made this step. Adler is justly considered a pioneer in this (1964, p. 87 et passim).

Modern psychology is recognizing this principle more and more: Allport (Shulman, 1973, pp. 11, 13); Family Therapy Movement (Minuchin, 1974); Erickson (Watzlawick, et al., 1974, Preface); Group Therapy (Yalom, 1975, p. 121); Neuro Linguistic Programming (Bandler & Grinder, 1979). But historicism is still an everyday trap for students and more experienced therapists.

Adler (1964), in describing the individual, was impressed by the movement displayed during the necessarily short life span. Yet he was aware of the need to stop the movement, at least in principle, in order to see the system: "Although it was necessary to freeze the movement in order to see it as form, we have always maintained the viewpoint that all is movement" (p. 195).

Now history (of a language, an individual, a nation) is a discipline in its own right. The caution and suspicion shown by Saussurean linguistics toward history is only aimed at its confusion with synchronic description. In the latter frame, it may only serve as an additional explanatory material, fit for footnotes and mainly needed to satiate causality-hungry minds. It puts at ease the curious linguist in the same way Dreikurs' (1973, pp. 87ff) Family Constellation material serves to make plausible, hence acceptable, the individual's convictions as they are read from the Early Recollections, a synchronic test. Actually, Adlerians who wholly believe in the synchronicity of Early Recollections would perhaps do better to interpret the latter first, then corroborate them with the Family Constellation data, to prevent any possible contamination.

5. Relevance and Choice

5.1.1. In Linguistics Relevance is Choice

Human behavior is an extremely complex and heterogeneous phenomenon... One could study the way sounds are produced by the mouth, vocal chords, and tongue; one could investigate the sound waves which are emitted and the way they affect the hearing mechanism. One could consider the signifying intention of the speaker, the aspects of the world to which his utterance refers, the immediate circumstances of the communicative context which might have led him to produce a particular series of noises. One might try to analyze the conventions which enable speaker and listeners to understand one another, working out the grammatical and semantic rules which they must have assimilated if they are to communicate in this way. Or again, one could trace the history of the language which makes available these particular forms at this time (Culler, 1977, pp. 8-9).

As has been indicated (Sec. 3.1), Saussure chose to describe the system of conventions that relates noises to ideas -- la langue. But even this definite choice of subject matter seems too wide. If I wish to describe the trees in the park behind my house, I have to choose what aspect or aspects of these trees will interest me. If I am interested in their beauty, that is one thing I shall describe. If I like to know their different species, I shall look for differences in leaves, flowers, bark color, and other criteria for botanical taxonomy. I may want to state which grows faster or gives more shade, or which is best for burning in the fireplace. My goal will determine what I choose out of the numerous "traits" that trees may show. I shall dwell on what is relevant, pertinent to my goal. The rest of the traits may be mentioned accidentally, but does not really pertain to my investigation. Each different goal thus dictates a different picture of "trees".

It would seem that each of us knows our language well enough and can indicate what communicates what, and how. Yet this is not the case. The intimate, symbiotic relation between people and their language makes the task of understanding our own communication process a very hard one. Therefore, we need a scientific discipline, linguistics, whose main function would be one of explicitation of intuitive knowledge. More specifically, the linguist's function would be to state what is the communication-relevant part within the conventions of la langue. As in the case of trees, one might at first assume that all elements of the system communicate all the time, since this is clearly the raison d'être of languages. Or, in Don Jackson's words, "One cannot not communicate" (Yalom, 1975, p. 109). But this is not true of language: some of its elements, at least some of the time, do not communicate any information. They are a dead weight that other, relevant elements carry along. They are redundant features.

What makes an element relevant (pertinent, significant, distinctive are some equivalent terms used in the Prague Circle of Linguistics; Saussure used standing in opposition, 1959, p. 121) to communication? Our criterion will be the existence of choice among elements. A relevant sign (or chain of signs), when substituted for another sign (or chain) in a specific environment, changes the information communicated. In other words, replacing a relevant sign changes the meaning of the utterance that encompasses it. This represents an act of free choice for the speaker. But replacing an irrelevant sign brings about an error. No choice is involved. An example: pupils all around the world have much trouble with prepositions when studying English as a second language. In special exercises, they are made to choose the right preposition

to fit in a given sentence. Some of these little words may be relevant to the information contained in the sentence, as in

The vase stands on the table.
under
above
behind
in front of
near
 etc.

By relevant I mean that on may be replaced by any other sign in its column, with a concomitant change in the meaning of the sentence. This is the easy part, because all the pupil has to do is choose a preposition denoting location that would make sense. But in sentences like, He insisted --- getting the money back, you have to know what comes after insisted. Here the environment comes into play. You just insert on; if you try to replace it by in, of, or for, etc., you have committed an error. On would accordingly seem to constitute an important part of the idiom insist on. Paradoxically, it is not communicably relevant. It does not communicate anything except convention; it has to be there, and is accordingly said to be conditioned by its environment, in this case by the verb insist. Note that if I construct a sentence such as, He insisted for getting the money back, I will probably be perfectly understood, even if frowned at.

Some elements in our life are never relevant regardless of the environment. As Henry Ford used to say, "You can choose any color Model T Ford you want, as long as it is black." Thus the fact that you had a black Model T did not communicate anything about you or your wishes -- you had no choice.

5.1.2. Choice in Psychology

Coming now to psychology, we should be reminded on a somewhat superficial level that the psychological investigation is a phenomenological dialogue between a data source (speaker) and an investigator (hearer) and is thus a process of communication investigated in situ (Sec. 8.2) of a metacommunication or "talking about talking". More deeply, the description of a person's makeup and behavior itself needs the distinction of relevance. Indeed, the idea of free choice or relevance is a central one in every therapy, transcending the domain of pure descriptivism into the realm of prescribing better adjustment: the more choices (or autonomy) one has, the freer one is and the more significant ("relevant") is the behavior, as in this discussion of marriage:

If there is a single predeterminant factor in divorce, it is probably that individuals marry before they have firmly established a sense of independent selfhood...Each partner needs to have discovered that he or she can bear the fundamental anxiety of being a single biological entity in a rather frightening world (Napier & Whitaker, 1978, p. 221).

In other words, only a person who can either live alone or live with someone else, can relevantly choose a mate. Anyone who feels compelled to escape from loneliness has not freely chosen a lover but has only chosen the lesser of two evils.

Human choice is basic to Adler's theory. It is seen already in his view of heredity and environment as factors determining some development and responses, yet leaving an area of free will and creativity for the individual.

Let us invent an example:

An expression of altruistic feelings and concomitant behavior might be relevant in a person, i.e., communicate "real" feeling and behavior, if that person has chosen to express altruism. The choice is proven if the individual can replace it by other feelings, in accordance with

his or her judgment of the situation -- for example, indifference or anger.

If a person can never express the other feelings, the person's altruism is conditioned, obligatory, and thus really expresses nothing. What it does is tell us something about the conditioning in the person's "grammar", the individual's personality makeup. The exact content of the "unchosen", conditioned feeling or behavior (in this case "altruism") may be considered irrelevant, too, just as on in insist on has no relevant meaning. Psychoanalysts would spend time in unearthing its source, perhaps successfully. But this historical "grammatical work" done on irrelevant content is not really necessary. Neuro-linguistic Programmers have openly declared, even more than Adlerians, their lack of interest with the content of ideation and of complaints. They ignore it or even ask the patient to be spared hearing it, in order to treat what they call the process, i.e., the pure relations (Bandler & Grinder, 1979). In this approach, then, content may be used by a therapist just to get closer rapport with a client, to know what assignments they may be asked to perform, or to counsel them vocationally.

Freedom of choice, or relevance, lies at the basis of the following discussion of change by a group of Mental Research Institute authors:

Change is such a pervasive and immediate element of our experience that it could become the subject of thought only after the early Greek philosophers had been able to conceptualize the antithetical concept of invariance or persistence.

Until then there was nothing that change could be conceptually contrasted with (this is a matter of conceptualizing experience, not of finding "reality"), and the situation must have been like one proposed by Whorf: that in a universe in which everything is blue, the concept of blueness cannot be developed for lack of contrasting colors (Watzlawick, et al., 1974, pp. 1-2).

Similar to this is Bernard H. Shulman's observation that:

In psychoanalysis, everything is transference; you need a positive transference, but also a negative one. If that is the case, then we may switch to "everything without transference" or "nothing is transference", just behavior (1978).

In our terms, transference is not a relevant element in treatment, if there is no way of considering a treatment without it, just like the blue in a blue universe. (Incidentally, psychoanalysts could use their notion of the ubiquity of transference for treating everything on the "here and now", which they do not do because of their historical perspective. It might still be, as Haley (1963) maintains, that whatever success they do have is due solely to the here-and-now interaction with the therapist.)

5.2. Neutralization

5.2.1. Oppositions in Language. Some elements of language are relevant wherever they figure. Others are only in some environments, while in other placements, they become conditioned, or, in the Prague Circle terminology, the oppositions obtaining among them are neutralized (Troubetzkoy, 1939). This was the case with the English prepositions cited above. A human analogy for that is the following:

If I live in Israel, does this communicate that I am a Zionist?
Yes, if I have the choice to live somewhere else; then my staying in Israel is relevant. No, if because of money or visa difficulties I do not have the choice to leave. Note that in the latter case, we do not know anything about my Zionism; I might still be Zionist, but the lack of choice prevents it from being communicated relevantly (to others and to myself).

As already remarked, irrelevant elements or choicelessness is important in some sense: it shows the idiographic conventions of a system (e.g., English) and is part of its grammar. It is thus a necessary part of describing that system. In the same vein, the Model T story tells us about economy and car industry in the United States; and being compelled to stay in Israel might be a very important factor in my life, and so on.

A case of neutralization is also the following:

Does my enlisting in the Military Forces communicate anything about my wishing to be in service? Could I be said to be a militarist? Yes, if I live in one environment, let us say the U.S., where everybody now has the choice. No, if I live in Israel, where I have to go in the military for three years, no matter what I want.

5.2.2. Neutralized Psychological Choice. Concerning neutralization in psychology, there are clearly situations (environments) where a choice that a person has is neutralized in favor of just one possible element. An example is a grown person that, when visiting his or her parents, starts feeling and acting as an adolescent. Or that of a bisexual male that becomes a prisoner and, while with other males, loses (neutralizes) the possibility of choosing between males and females.

This brings up the concept of "role", as seen by sociologists, e.g., by Sarbin or Goffman. We may perhaps see "role" as a neutralization of personal choices in a given environment.

The famous saying by Luther, used by Adler, about looking at the person's fists rather than listening to his words, may, in the terminology I am using, mean that a person's words in the interview situation are bound to be false to some degree, i.e., neutralized by the environment; but the non-verbal

behavior is freer, not as conditioned, and therefore the gestures made communicate relevant information.

Zero Elements

In Linguistics. Note that the "negative" nature of linguistic identity (Saussure, 1959, p. 117) makes it unnecessary for any element to have a positive existence or form. The lack of elements is enough for maintaining a communicative opposition. In English, the singular noun has a no-suffix form, i.e. ends with a zero-morpheme ($\emptyset$ -morpheme), as opposed to the plural morpheme: horse- $\emptyset$: horse-s. This is not the case in, for example, Latin, where equ-us opposes equ-i. Similarly, the verb forms in the English present tense show an opposition between -s and $\emptyset$: He (She, It) move-s; I move- $\emptyset$. (Cf. Saussure, 1959, pp. 86-87 , for more examples.)

In Psychology. In psychology it is clear that an omission on the part of a person may be as important as an action, thought or feeling. As Mosak (1977, 1982) states in his courses, "Lack of movement in life is also a movement." Also, a life task that is not fulfilled may be seen as a relevant zero-behavior, communicating a decision not to approach that task. Similarly, a recollection that contains just males, or just females, or just grownups, etc., shows relevant elements by their very absence.

Complementary Distribution

Of Linguistic Elements. Another important interplay of environment and relevance is called complementary distribution. The term was put forward by American Structuralists, probably by Z. S. Harris, but fits into the Saussurean and the Prague-Circle thinking (Frei, 1968). For example, the English plural suffix has a few forms:

- s in the environment of unvoiced consonants: cat-s (phonetic kâets);
- z in the environment of voiced consonants: dog-s (phonetic dogz);
- z in the environment of hiss-sounds or hush-sounds: horse-s (phonetic hors z), switch-es (phonetic swit z);
- en in the environment of ox-: oxen;
- ren in the environment of child-: children.

All these forms of the plural morpheme are relevant, for their replacement by Ø (zero) yields a change in meaning from "plural" to "singular". Yet among themselves no substitution is permitted. Each is conditioned by its specific environment and their distribution is complementary, as no one is ever found in the other's "territory"; and their differential distributions complement each other to make up the total distribution of the plural morpheme -- after all nouns.

To exemplify this in everyday life, let us look at a student's room with a bed and a desk. Is this a bedroom or a study? There is no single relevant name denoting this kind of room, because one has no choice of leaving the "bedroom" in order to step into the "study". The uses of the rooms stand in complementary distribution to each other, the conditioning environment being

probably the hour of the day. The two differential distributions (sleep hours and study hours) make up the whole 24 hours of a day, and the resulting composite element may be called, if we wish, a bed-study room or the like.

A therapist's office may have complementary uses too: the therapist may be busy either interviewing people, or writing a paper, or having a group. It is just that we are so used to this double or triple use that we do not heed the complementarity contained in the term office.

Reconciles Contradictions in Psychology. In Adlerian psychotherapy, complementary distribution is one of the ways to reconcile "contradictions" in a client's report or in the early recollections ("two points on a line" in Dreikurs' words) or, as Harold H. Mosak has said (Class notes from Course 315, Life Style Diagnosis, Alfred Adler Institute of Chicago, 1983 Spring Quarter):

Recollections can't contradict each other, given the holism principle; under condition A we may find x; under condition B, y. The details and the feelings help find the conditions.

Another instance mentioned by Mosak (Class notes from Course 471, Continuing Case Seminar, Alfred Adler Institute of Chicago, 1983 Summer Quarter) is that the status of fun in a person's life is as part of the work task: fun hours complement work hours to the sum total of hours one spends apart from sleeping.

Further Dependencies

Hjelmslev (1961) deepened our understanding of relations and relevance

when he pointed out that there must be three kinds of relations between elements:

1. Constellation: the relevant elements that can appear without presupposition (conditioning) among them -- stand + on + the + table, etc.
2. Unilateral Dependence: one element presupposes the appearance of the other -- insist-on, where the former conditions the latter, or, viewed from the other side, on presupposes the existence in the text of insist.
3. Interdependence: both elements condition each other, or presuppose each other, as in "grammatical concord" between these and the -s of thing-s in these things.

In psychology, a well-known instance of interdependence (in a system larger than the individual) is that of marriage, described thus by Napier and Whitaker (1978):

At the beginning of the marriage both partners are quite insecure and they "merge" their separate abilities and needs into a tightly dependent unit...Compromising their own needs in order to please each other is easy enough for a while, but after several years marriage begins to feel like an enormous set of demands within which they both have a sense of being small and insignificant. The set of demands in which they feel engulfed is really a two-sided dependency, but in their minds the jailer is Marriage (p. 223).

Semiology

As seen in the above discussion, different facets of human life necessitate the distinction relevant/irrelevant in order to understand their message. This brings us back to Saussure, who suggested the necessity of a discipline of semiology (or semiotics), to encompass every kind of communication in human behavior. It was Troubetzkoy (1939) who argued that this cannot be accomplished

by the methods of the natural sciences, which are concerned with the intrinsic properties of natural phenomena themselves; the social and human sciences, on the other hand, are concerned with the social use of material objects and must therefore distinguish between the objects themselves and the system of distinctive (relevant, differential) features which give them meaning and value. Troubetzkoy uses the example of the message of clothing, e.g., skirt length, quality of fabric or color. Subsequent semiological research has been conducted on many facets of human life, including foods, architecture, music, literature, social etiquette, advertising, fashion and so on (Culler, 1977, pp. 101ff).

Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Planes

Saussure's Distinction

Saussure distinguished between syntagmatic and associative (later paradigmatic) relations in any portion of a text. The former is the relation holding in the chain of elements, i.e. among elements that coexist in the same utterance or are compatible with one another. Syntagm is thus a general name that applies to any length of linguistic units that have at least two sub-units: to words, compound words, phrases (word groups), whole sentences, etc. His examples were: re-lire, "re-read"; contre tous, "against everyone"; la vie humaine, "human life"; Dieu est bon, "God is good"; S'il fait beau temps, nous sortirons, "If the weather is nice, we'll go out" (1959, pp. 123-124).

The syntagmatic plane is actually a necessary corollary of another linguistic fact stressed by Saussure -- the linearity of the signifier. Language, like music, takes place in time, because it is based on the sense of hearing. It is thus unidimensional, unlike a bidimensional picture, for example, where much more information can be condensed.

Every syntagm has its own type of organization (or structure, or pattern, etc.); re-read is analysable into re-, a prefix, and read, the verb infinitive. If the weather is nice, we'll go out is analyzable into a conditional clause, If the weather is nice, then a main clause, we'll go out, and may naturally be analyzed further and further.

Syntagmatic analysis has constituted the business of linguistics ever since, under different names: syntax, word inflection, word formation, compounding, and other. It was Saussure who pointed out that syntagmatics is made possible by an additional dimension of analysis, the "associative", which is the "list" of all syntagms capable of replacing a given stretch of the syntagmatic chain without destroying its organization or structure, yet changing the overall meaning. In

If	it	rains	we	will	go	out
When		snows	they	might	speak	up
While			I	can	come	along
.		.	you	.	remain	in
.		.	.	.	.	.
.		.	.	.	.	.

the horizontal line is syntagmatic, the vertical columns show "associative" possibilities of replacement. The essential property of units in the columns is that they are not, in this present syntagm, compatible with each other. They can only substitute for each other, as they have a certain similarity or ~~common~~ denominator, so that "personal pronouns" substitute for each other:

we
they
I
you
.
.

which makes them a class or paradigm (Hjelmslev has suggested this term, which has since become almost universal). Within the ~~common~~ denominator, however, each term differs, so that choice is possible among different meanings.

The syntagmatic and the paradigmatic planes thus provide two coordinates whereby every unit can be located or identified. In our example, will is located between we and go out, but its full identification requires that we know its class or list of substitutables: might, can, should, etc. Similarly substitution-class alone is not enough, because the same class might be represented twice or more in the same text, so that the syntagmatic location is called for. Certain American linguists, notably Z. S. Harris, maintained that they only used syntagmatic distribution. Yet this claim is impossible by the very definition of the planes (Frei, 1968). Chomsky, Harris's student, also tends to use structure in the syntagmatic sense alone, whereas Europeans stress the importance of paradigmatic structure, which is the source of the unit's value in the system of the language.

Let us be reminded that the data of language is the as yet unanalyzed text, which is the external, physical chain of noises (or, in writing, the letters), with our global understanding of it. Only by performing an analysis on the text, i.e. by assigning paradigmatic classes to the different portions of the syntagmatic organization, can we perform that analysis and know which portion contributed which meaning-element. This work must be carried on for every utterance anew, for the divisions between units are not supplied in speaking, and some divisions (hence identities) might be ambiguous, remaining undecided until a decision is made following the complete analysis. In If it rains we will go out, who is to say that If it- is to be divided, assigned to classes and understood, as If it... rather than I fit...? Present day English writing divides words; but many writing systems do not. Speech, in any language,

is invariably an undivided chain with no pauses, and must be analyzed anew for each utterance we hear.

Awareness of the Dimensions in Psychology

For psychology, since we believe that it is the significance (value) of a behavior in a given context which constitutes its meaning, there seems to be some advantage in being aware of the above "coordinates" view. A syntagmatic plane will consist here of the continuum of behaviors (actions, thoughts and emotions) of a person in a given situation or event. The paradigmatic plane will comprise the ensemble of possibilities for choice in every point on the chain of behaviors.

The syntagmatic chain of behavior is unique for every person, no less than the paradigm or class of choices at one's disposal. A psychologist needs to study typical syntagms of a person (behavior chains) with their classes of personal choices -- learn the person's "language of behavior" -- in order to understand the person. A therapist might then wish to teach the person some additional choices or suggest a change in the syntagmatic order of units in the chain, additions or omissions from it.

All this is no doubt what therapists do anyway. But a consciousness of the necessity of the two dimensions, together with the notion of the value (use) of each choice, can help them be explicit, at least with themselves.

Let us note that a syntagm or text has no a priori delimited length. The whole life movement of a person may be seen as a text with a given goal, striven after but never fully attained, like a text by Maupassant. Or we

might choose to regard a portion of a life, be it even hours or a five minute span, as our text, again with its goal. Here we can also locate the hierarchy of goals in a person's life: long-text goals vs. short- or medium-text ones.

Analysis: From Larger to Smaller Units

In Linguistics

Closely related to the issue of analyzing into the syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes is the question of the direction of the analysis. Do we start with the smallest elements, using them to describe and explain the composition of the larger units? This direction may be called synthetic procedure ("combining" or "putting together").

The other possible direction is starting with the largest part, dividing it to smaller units. A convenient name for this is analytic procedure, i.e., "taking apart, loosening".

As we shall presently see, Saussure's concept of value and system automatically decides in favor of analytic procedure. But let us look first at the more practical side, the kind of data that the linguist encounters:

If the linguistic investigator is given anything..., it is the as yet unanalyzed text in its undivided and absolute integrity. Our only procedure, if we wish to order a system to the process of that text, will be an analysis in which the text is regarded as a class analyzed into components, then these components are classes analyzed into components, and so on until the analysis is exhausted. This procedure [is] analytic and specifying, not synthetic and generalizing, movement, as the opposite of induction" (Hjelmslev, 1961, pp. 12-13).

Of the linguists who gave the matter a thought, American structuralists (e.g. Harris) were mostly syntheticists; European structuralists are either for analysis (e.g. Malmberg, Dressler; cf. Barri, 1977, pp. 20-21) or took the two procedures to be, at least some time, equivalent, as did Chomsky later. If I

may quote myself (Barri, 1977):

To claim equivalence of synthesis and analysis is to ignore the very basis of their definition. To understand what analytic means is to admit that the linguist's data are not isolated examples in grammar-books but whole texts. The only way to arrive at isolating a linguistic entity is by taking apart a more comprehensive structure. One may of course PRESENT one's finding synthetically, by building up from the smallest units, if one prefers this. But presentation is always secondary (pp. 20-21).

As an example, let us assume that we wish to describe synthetically the use of an element of English language traditionally called adverb, supposing for a moment that we know what this is. The description is synthetic first of all in that we posit "adverb" as a known or definable unit, whose use and ways of combination with other definable words are to be investigated. Let us proceed by picking out all those known adverbs. We may do it in a text, or out of our memory. Everybody knows that an English adverb should contain an adjective plus the "adverbial morpheme" -ly, as in justly, competently, etc. (We are still being synthetic, defining "adverb" by its known parts.)

The trouble is that this procedure will yield, besides many satisfactory "adverbs", some words that do not seem to belong: friendly, ghastly, miserly, etc. We now conclude that -ly is necessary but not enough. Next we remember that some short words like fast, well, hard, always, etc., were considered by our teachers as adverbs, too. If that is so, then the -ly morpheme is not even necessary. The final blow is a notion we have, that certain phrases behave like "adverbs". Such are in vain, for good, with her eyes shut, and many others.

Now we suddenly realize that we have no handle at all on "adverbs". We cannot identify them, let alone define them, because there is no one way they are put together from existing units. The only possible procedure seems to be

the opposite, analytic one: start from the whole text (understand all of it) and pick up those components of the large class (in this case, the sentence-class) that are found in a specific link with verbs, a link that we decide -- with tradition -- to name "adverbial". Only after having isolated this group of expressions can we try to analyze each of them further, taking it as a class to be divided into components. We will eventually discover how varied "adverbs" are, some ending by -ly, others very differently. We will also discover that some traditional "adverbs", such as very, have not been included, because they are never linked with a verb. The traditional concept "adverb" is thus breaking up before our eyes, the same as most of traditional grammar.

Coming back to theory now, there is a basic property of systems, or Gestalts, that dictates that their description take the analytic procedure: they form a network of relations among "objects" that have their identity not immanently, but by force of being "intersections" of mutual dependences (See Sec. 2.2.1.). This is essentially the old Gestaltist saying: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts."

I take this paradoxical saying to mean that, since the parts of a whole do not "exist" as objects but only by their relationship with that whole, there is no way of summing them up to create the whole. You can only take apart the whole to find out what are the relationships inside it, thereby defining them. As Saussure (1959) says, explicitly:

The idea of value...shows that to consider a term simply as the union of a certain sound with a certain concept...would isolate the term from its system; it would mean assuming that one can start from the terms and construct the system by adding them together when, on the contrary, it is from the interdependent whole that one must start and through analysis obtain its elements (p. 113).

Hjelmslev (1961) further widens our horizons as to what is to be included in the linguistic analysis:

Already in this point the analysis differs essentially from the traditional one. For the latter is concerned neither with parts of the text that have very great extension nor those that have very small extension. An explicit or implicit tradition has it that the work of the linguist begins with dividing sentences into clauses, while it is thought possible to refer the treatment of larger parts of the text, groups of sentences and the like, to other sciences -- principally logic and psychology. According to this view the linguist or the grammarian should, when faced with an unanalyzed text, as, for example, the one that is provided by all that is written and said in Danish, be able to plunge headlong down to a stage where it is resolved into clauses;...the larger textual parts must be further partitioned into productions of single authors, works, chapters, paragraphs, and the like, on the basis of premission, and then in the same way into sentences and clauses (pp. 97-99).

In Adlerian Psychology

In psychology, Adler had very similar ideas about the direction of description. He recognized the indivisibility of man (what has since been called holism by Smuts) and the need to "catch" his guiding line as a prerequisite to understanding any part-phenomena of his. Thus, for example, for Adlerians intelligence is not a given, but part of the whole that is developed to such and such degree (perhaps within the limits of heredity) in the service of the whole organism. Similarly, hypersensitivity, hyperactivity or shyness in a child are not given traits, least of all biologically dictated. They are ways to achieve the child's goals and cannot be understood and put in their proper place without understanding the overall goal. This stood and still stands in great contrast to academic psychology with its part traits and part capacities, all of them "building up" the description of a person, in a typically synthetic way.

Adler's way contrasted also with Freud's description, where part structures (Id, Ego, Superego) part "topoi" (conscious, subconscious, unconscious) individual traumata and complexes (Oedipus, for example) "are there" and their sum builds up personality. "Freud explains the higher by the lower" complains Yalom (1975, p. 86). Of course, Freud spoke also of interplay among all these, as well as among defense mechanisms, etc. But the spirit is that of "synthesized" elements coming into relationship, not emerging from it.

A further (or better, an even more basic) tenet of Adler was the social embeddedness of the individual. It is hard to adduce direct evidence that Adler had a definite recommendation to start the description (or understanding) of a person from without, i.e., from the social environment. But his way of formulating his ideas about society suggests an analytic procedure, from the social to the individual:

We refuse to recognize and examine an isolated human being.

In addition to regarding an individual's life as a unit, we must also take it together with its context of social relations.

The style or the pattern of a child's life cannot be understood without reference to the person who looks after him.

In order to understand what goes on in an individual, it is necessary to consider his attitude toward his fellow men.

For before the individual life of man there was the community.

For a long time now I have been convinced that all the questions of life can be subordinated to the three major problems -- the problem of communal life, of work, and of love (Adler, 1964, pp. 126-128, 131).

This understanding of humankind primarily by the social living fits well with Hjelmslev's widening the scope of linguistic research to texts larger than the sentence. Talking about systems (See Sec. 2.2.2), we saw how Napier and Whitaker (1978)

consider "man" a middle link in the hierarchy of systems starting with the "world community of nations" and ending with the "atomic particle" (pp. 49-50). It is an almost exact counterpart of Hjelmslev's stages of descending analysis (See p. 51). Moreover, the writers explicitly follow the analytic procedure in their picture of treatment:

Ideally, we would like to start with the largest system we are able to assemble, then work with progressively smaller subsystems. For example, if we discover there is a war going on between the two families of origin, it is preferable to start therapy at that level. We want to relate to the most global system first, then move on to the smaller subsystems. After the branches of the family are no longer at war, we concentrate on the nuclear family that initially got in touch with us. When the children have been disentangled from the couple's problems, we may work for some time with the couple. When there seem to be no further pressing relationship battles and when our allegiance to the entire group is well established, we can then work with individuals. But individual therapy should be like the Ph.D. -- the last stage in training. Individual therapy is for the person who has learned to live with others and now wants to work further on living more comfortably with himself (Napier & Whitaker, 1978, p. 273).

8

Subjectivity or Objectivity -- Speaker or Hearer

8.1 The Linguist as Hearer

The terms objective and subjective are used in more than one sense, and, depending on the user, easily become value-laden.

In linguistics, a way out of the terminological danger was Saussure's consideration of the nature of the communication-circuit contracted between (at least) two people (1959, p. 12). Simply stated, when A speaks, he translates his thinking into sounds and transmits sound waves. B receives them and translates them into the (hopefully) corresponding ideas. In this event there is an external, physical part, the transmission, presumably more objectively understood by science. Yet this parole side of the circuit (cf. Sec. 3.1) belongs with phonetics, and is for Saussure just an auxiliary discipline of the investigation of languages, which properly should deal with langue. (Saussure points out that sound waves can be dealt with without understanding them, 1959, p. 13). What remains after discarding the parole is the internal, "personal" parts of the circuit, representing the speaker and the hearer. These "psychological" parts would presumably be more subjective or non-verifiable, less amenable to scientific research.

Where does the linguist come in this circuit? What sort of data is collected and worked out? We saw that, if the physical acoustic side is out, there remain either speaker-data or hearer-data to be occupied with.

As I have maintained elsewhere (Barri, 1977, pp. 19-20), the linguist may be in touch with the data on the circuit only by intercepting it and being "on the same line", as a third party. It is now that he has to make his most crucial decision concerning the nature of his work. He might listen quietly, trying not to disturb the participating parties. He might take notes, record or otherwise collect data for his work. Whatever he does, he is a listener or hearer. He may "listen" to (oral) speech or to a written text, or to otherwise coded messages (like Braille, flag-codes or Morse), but he is always a hearer, a passive receiver. Of course, he has to be versed in the system or code used, to know how to decode it. In other words, he has to understand the language, to be a (native or not) member of the speech community using that language.

Taking the hearer-position allows the linguist to preserve some objectivity yet be "in". For example, every linguist can analyze and re-analyze the same (in some way recorded) material, thus replicating the observation. There is still the subjective part of understanding -- a linguist as a hearer might understand the same text differently from his colleagues. We can try to control this side danger by insisting, as above, that the linguist be a member of the speech community. Moreover, since language use is dependent on and complemented by the verbal context and the external situation, he should be part of, or versed in, the context of the speech-event (or the writing-event, etc.). No language can be understood out of real contexts, because no (natural) language has ever developed such a perfect, elaborate mechanism as to be context and situation-free.

The linguist might try, on the other hand, to become an active participant, talking on the circuit. But then he loses his position of data-observer and analyzer, unless he listens to or records his own utterances, too. Note that if he does that, he automatically becomes a listener again, to his own speech. As may easily be guessed, this procedure runs the risk of subjectivity and distortion of the data: the linguist is no "naive subject" and the data extracted from his speech should mostly be rejected (at least whenever we can get hold of "naive subjects'" data).

There is only one way out of the status of linguist-as-hearer, if the linguist so desires: to try and investigate what goes on within the speaker's mind. He might infer what ideation takes place in the other speaker's head, just before he transmits his speech (or writing), or he may observe his own thinking at the same point. The trouble is, this pre-speech thinking is, by definition, pre-language material. It would not properly belong to the discipline of linguistics. However, it might well fit into psychology. It is my contention that the hearer-orientation (or if you like, data-orientation) in linguistics is what has granted it its leading place among the Sciences of Man. Its objectivity, rigor, accuracy, so often envied by human scientists, all stem from that orientation.

8.2 Adler's Phenomenology as a Hearer Position

Now where is the meeting-point between linguist and psychologist in this basic orientation? We have just allowed that the latter's domain might rightly consist of the subjective, speaker's orientation. Is psychology condemned to

subjectivity? Here we must not lose sight of the fact that communication is not only the subject matter of linguistics, but finds its place in every human investigation, even though on other levels.

Adler's psychology is often said to be subjective, phenomenological (the Ansba-chers; Adler, 1964, pp. 4, 14, 105, etc.). What does this mean from the point of view of hearer vs. speaker orientation?

First, let us note again the multiple uses of subjective and objective: Adler's psychology is subjective mainly in its view of human causality as being teleological, finalistic; and of heredity and circumstances as being probabilities only, or "soft determiners" (Idem, 1964, p. 9). Freud's, on the other hand, is "objective" by its reduction of causation to biological drives, phylogenetic universal myths and symbols, and, less often, to environmental explanations of the S-R type.

For an extensive discussion of Freud's and Adler's differences, see Ansbacher and Ansbacher (Adler, 1964, 1-18 etc.). We may add that Freud also "objectified" concepts in the sense that he reified them into existing entities. The famous examples are the conscious part of the psyche vs. the unconscious one, the Id-Ego-Superego "structures", the "hydraulic" flow of libido ("steam-engine model") (See Powers, 1975).

Yet Adler may be said to be an "objectivist", in his stressing of the consequences of the person's acts, thoughts and feelings on the outside world and especially on other people. This is also the case with Adler's insistence on the individual responsibility towards society. For Adler, nothing is just internal, personal. Everything finds its expression on the social side, and is

judged by it. Adler's and Dreikurs' way of understanding traits and feelings was precisely by testing their objective correlates -- what are their objective consequences.

It may be said that the Adlerian understanding of a person starts with an appraisal of his objective standing vis-a-vis the life tasks, and only then come the understanding of the style of life. Actually, the style itself as well as the "basic mistakes" are formulated with an eye on the objective, external reality. Freud and his followers, on the other hand, have a "soft", subjectivist side whenever it is question of the individual's responsibility in the world. Socially as well as legally, Freud's individual is an innocent victim, driven by blind drives that he does not "own". Freud is thus, strangely enough, "objective" on the inner side of man, subjective on the outer side. I find Adler's disposition much more natural and logical -- subjective on the inner side of a person, yet recognizing the objective reality of social and material life outside.

As has been shown, subjective and objective, when referring to Adler, are both in place. Yet there is another aspect of the dichotomy, a crucial one, that brings Adler in line with Saussurean objective, hearer-oriented, linguistics: his heuristic method.

Adler's method of describing a person is phenomenological.

Now this method is considered highly subjective when contrasted with rigorous operational methods like those of behaviorism (admittedly poor in psychological content and "explaining force"). But compared with Freud's speculative psychoanalytic method, phenomenology is highly objective.

Phenomenology was used by Husserl and Jaspers as:

The descriptive psychology of the phenomena of consciousness. The understanding of these descriptions is based on empathy (Jaspers). Phenomenology is an empirical method based exclusively on communication on the part of the subject, and in principle does not differ from the method of objective description (Jaspers). But in practice a good phenomenological description is particularly difficult. "Just as children at first draw what they know rather than what they see, so the [psychologist] goes through a stage where he somehow reasons out the psychological content of the patient before he reaches an unprejudiced immediate comprehension...an ever new effort and a property which must be ever newly acquired....(Jaspers).

This view of phenomenology, given by Ansbacher and Ansbacher (in Adler, 1964, p. 14) is, as they stress, decidedly Adlerian, although Adler did not use the term phenomenology. For our purpose here, let us note that the investigator-psychologist is, very much like the linguist (See Sec. 8.1), the hearer of the subject's communication, trying to maximize his understanding of that communication by using empathy with the subject. In linguistic work this would sound: by using his knowledge of the language. As we insisted above, linguistic communication is never free of ambiguities, and the ever-prejudiced linguist must penetrate the hic et nunc of the subject's context and situation on which the true (phenomenological) understanding of the text is depending. In this important methodological sense Adler's psychology and Saussurean linguistic are very close.

It is not an accident that the dialectic "hearing of A's communication by B" is an integral part of the method. Any hearing of oneself is introspection, and yields very different results, from those of hearing the other in linguistics and psychology alike. I suspect that a good deal of the discussions and arguments in both fields stem from the different methods of data-collecting. Freud, besides his own use of phenomenology, based much of his conclusions on

his introspection during his famous self-analysis, and on that of some of his early patients. This gave birth to all kinds of personal fantasies and myths, and these were objectified, reified, and put into universal use in diagnosis and explanation -- the psychoanalytic speculative content of the unconscious.

Compared to the phylogenetic and ontogenetic myths and symbols of psychoanalysis (For an elegant refutation of the psychoanalytic use of the myth of Oedipus, see Powers, 1973, with some bibliography; on symbols: Mosak, 1977, pp. 9-11; 55-59), its complex drive array, suppression and repression and the defense mechanisms, phenomenology-based theories offer very meager "explanations" of personality states, in the same way that S-R theories offer meager explanation (black box model) in contrast with phenomenological dialectics.

This inequality is to be found in contemporaneous linguistics, too. Chomsky, in the 1950s, was vexed by the explicative dryness of the American Structuralists who followed L. Bloomfield (1933) in their Watsonian perspective (as far as this can be done in working with language). Chomsky then set forth a rich explicative theory of linguistic phenomena, involving numerous stages of "rule applications" and transformations made up for the explication, but nowhere to be seen. It is true that Chomsky, more sophisticated than Freud in the business of the philosophy of science and the role of models, posits his complex derivation and transformations as if they were purely models, only successful ones. But the fact that they were speculated by him, dependent as he is on his particular linguistic background and schooling, has given rise to many objections and to competing models, no one of which, by sophisticated definition, is to be verified. (See also Sections 9.1.1-6 of this paper.)

Saussuroids and Adleroids, or Friends of Saussure and Adler

In his article "The 'Friends of Adler' Phenomenon", W. O'Connell describes

a group of influential theorists and therapists of the human condition, some of whom have been students of Adler while none identify themselves with the Adlerian movement. Uniformly they regard Adler as a pioneer or even the father of the third force or humanistic approach to man. They proclaim Adler's insight into the force of will and freedom in human evolution. They exult his emphasis on self-induced constrictive movements of those with problems in living rather than on the static diagnoses of descriptive psychiatry. Yet while offering a hearty "yes" to Adler's clinical insights and social affirmations, all the Friends add hasty "but"s to their basic declarations. (1976, p. 5).

It seems that every great thinker has this kind of followers: that is perhaps the way ideas develop and change. In the present section I shall review some of the "friends of Saussure" -- Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, Piaget -- and also have a brief look at the work of Freud, who is considered by some as belonging in some way to the same movement as Adler.

Many people claim affinity with Adler's ideas; even more would join with Saussure's fame. We have no quarrel with those who, acknowledging it or not, have accepted, rediscovered or continued these two masters. Some of them have been mentioned in this paper. What should be pointed out, however, is those thinkers who, by the force of misleading labels or by misunderstanding have come to be associated with either Saussure or Adler. These are, as usual, those closest to either in time, geography, general school, etc.

9.1 Chomsky

Modern linguistics in America has been, for many people, strongly linked with the Transformational-Generative movement, authored by Noam Avram Chomsky. This has been all the more the case with psychologists and philosophers, for whom Chomsky's interests, essentially logical and psychological in nature, were readily welcome and easily digestible, much more so than purely linguistic thinking in all its specific complexity.

Noam Chomsky was born in 1928 in Philadelphia. He studied linguistics, mathematics and philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania from 1945 to 1951, and

He first made his reputation in linguistics....But the work for which he is now famous, the construction of a system of generative grammar, developed out of his interest in modern logic and the foundations of mathematics, and was only subsequently applied to the description of natural languages (Lyons, 1970, p. xii).

Chomsky was attracted to linguistics by his sympathy with the political views of the famous author of Structural Linguistics (1951), Zellig S. Harris. American Structuralism had for a long time been under a heavy Behavioristic influence, starting with Leonard Bloomfield, in many ways its founder (1933). Bloomfield's disciples (e.g., Bloch, Nida, Trager, Hockett, Harris) tried to introduce scientific rigor and objectivity into the framework of their mentor. They aspired to drive meaning out of linguistic research, because of its notorious subjectivity (an unthinkable attitude for Saussure, with his signified-signifier union; above, 1.1).

Another procedural claim was that language was to be described in discrete "levels": sounds (phonemics); morphemes (morphemics); clauses and sentences

(syntax); words (lexicon); and only in that order.

This tendency towards operationalism and pure descriptive work resulted in a great number of valuable descriptions, many of them done on American-Indian languages. Among other things, it served to educate linguists in the uniqueness of each different language and in the need for relativism. Universalism thus became impossible, and since the ideas of system and holism were not available for American linguistics at that time, they seemed to be left without a hypothesis about the nature of language.

It was this kind of structuralism that Chomsky ended by criticizing very bitterly, mainly on the grounds that it was "taxonomic", i.e., concerned with collecting and pigeonholing data, with no explanation of the hidden, creative force in man's language -- its deep structure.

Chomsky's first well-known publication, Syntactic Structures (1957), has indeed opened a new era, that of Generative Grammar, based on a mathematical and rationalistic universalism. At that time Chomsky had not read Saussure, whose Course was first published in English in 1959. Koerner (1973, p. 12) presents the evidence that Chomsky did read that translation, and even sees the second phase of Chomsky's theory, between 1962 and 1966, as triggered by that reading, and "therefore owes much to Saussure's work...(what he believed to be) Saussure's understanding of the nature of language."

Yet, despite some claims on Chomsky's part, the thinking of the two men is very far apart. Chomsky fell back, sometimes consciously, on many of the school-grammar notions inherited from ancient times (the Stoics, Aristotle), Middle Ages (The Speculative Grammar of the Modistae -- roughly 1200-1350 A.D.)

and Renaissance ("universal grammars" like La grammaire de Port Royal by Arnauld and Lancelot, 1660). It was just that popularized tradition that Saussure did so much towards discarding from serious linguistics, at least in Europe. Chomsky's position, that he himself describes (1964, p. 11) as "much closer to traditional grammar" (than American Structuralism) is thus a return to pre-modern thinking. It will be summarized in the following sections.

9.1.1. Universal Substance. Perhaps the most characteristic of Chomsky's position about man is his conviction that human language is so much more complex than behaviors found in other living creatures, that our brain must include specific, innate "biological schematism" by which language is acquired in infancy. This acquisition, according to Chomsky, is not explainable by current theories of learning, on the very grounds of the creativity involved in speaking: we are assumed to create sentences we have never heard before. Chomsky thus believes that each baby "re-invents" his competence in his mother tongue, using his innate "schematism", rather than learns it.

This provoking and much attacked view seems to have taken form in Chomsky's development in the following way:

(a) Chomsky claims that a sentence is to be explained by reconstructing its deep structure (a term not unlike Saussure's langue).

(b) He builds a model for explaining how people talk, creating new sentences all the time. The model includes a set of ordered rules that determine the generation of each sentence, from the moment of its first

conception in the mind of the speaker ("semantic component"), through a "syntactic component", till it is said aloud ("phonological component").

The rules were of two kinds: simple generative or "rewrite" ones, e.g., $S \rightarrow NP + VP$ (Sentence is to be rewritten as Noun Phrase plus Verb Phrase), then $NP \rightarrow T + N$ (Noun Phrase is to be rewritten as The plus Noun), and so on. Now when these rewrite rules do not yield the required final sentence, Chomsky has devised "stronger" rules, called transformations, applied in order to correct an outcome sentence by changing its order, by adding or deleting elements, very much in the manner a well programmed computer could do it.

(c) The model of generation, although declared to be a purely mathematical device (Ruwet, 1968, p. 32-33) really tries to follow a presumed production of an actual sentence by the speaker. It is thus reified or made into a substance: an actual set of operations containing some specific word classes, as Verb, Noun, etc.

(d) Chomsky tries and succeeds in postulating the same specific rules, with the same elements, in different languages. In other words, he maintains that the different surface structures of, **for example**, I have a headache, and J'ai mal à la tête (approximately, "I have a pain in my head") can ultimately be reduced to the same deep-structure rules. This would mean that all humans have the same specific way of producing sentences. Grammar therefore is universal.

(e) Chomsky concludes that universal grammar has to be innate, as it is impossible to account for the recurrence of such complex processes in humans without assuming that they are biologically determined.

The crucial step above is (c): reification of the generation. Had

Chomsky supposed, like most researchers, that humans just have the general capacity for learning language, without necessarily going through the same deep-structure stages of generating, he would not have been able to posit universals beyond the general human capacity (which is really trivial). No innate ideas would then be necessary.

All this says in essence that reification makes universals possible. The reverse is also true: the stipulation of universals requires reification and substance approach; the fact that all humans can talk is naturally a universal, only an uninteresting one. Only specifics count as convincing universals.

The only trouble with Chomsky's universals is that what he reified in (c) was a "deep" model of production. There is no way to prove or disprove that the model exists in any one person's mind, let alone in the minds of all people of all nations and tribes. Deep-structure here backfires at Chomsky; the very fact that it is deep or hidden makes it impossible to compare.

Chomsky's quest of universals is naturally in direct opposition to Saussure's "form, not substance", to his arbitrariness of signs, and to the linguistic relativism typical of structuralism.

Systems and Values. A second general characteristic of Chomsky's thinking concerns the systemicity of language. As we shall presently see, this goes back again to the issue of form and substance.

Chomsky sometimes uses the term system, but only in the sense of "body of elements" or "entity", not in the Saussurean or modern Systems-Theory

meaning: He does not seem to think of wholes and their constitutive parts, that get their functions from their being its parts. His grammar is said to be a replica of the speaker's competence, and is described as a device that produces all and only the well-formed sentences of the language (Lyons, 1970, pp. 43-44). The device, or machine, has for raw material the words and morphemes of the language, i.e., its lexicon, which again is no self-contained system, but a set of lists, open to additions and subtractions. The elements of the lexicon, labeled as Noun, Verb, Adverb, etc., are treated as existing objects, unaffected by the relations among them or the humans using them. This way there is no question of values conferred by the system. Seen thus, it is a relatively simple, almost naive, traditional picture of language.

9.1.3. Synchrony. Chomsky's linguistic education took place, as mentioned, within the American behaviorist structuralism. In that environment it was natural, even if not theoretically claimed, to treat each language synchronically. For one thing, Amerindian languages were "without history", for they did not possess writing. This practice seems to have been absorbed into Chomsky's thinking without questioning. Yet, perhaps because it was never theoretically discussed, he sometimes departs from it.

One such departure is the view that languages are open-ended entities, liable to the effects of the creativity of the human mind. The lexicon, as mentioned, is ever ready to receive new items from outside or by internal additions. Even if nothing else is added, the mere fact that one can count numbers ad infinitum would make the lexicon an open one. In the same vein,

the number of sentences in a language is open, since a change of a word or a number in a sentence would make it a new sentence.

This is a very mechanical way of seeing creativity or "newness", fit for a machine that does not recognize patterns, only strings -- a computer. For me, handling a sentence that has the same pattern as the next one, only with some change of words, is like peeling a new potato, differing from the next by its shape and size. This is a very uninteresting creativity.

But we are now interested in synchrony. In Saussurean terms, the addition of words to a lexicon is a historical development, even if it happens during a very short time. Even numbers do not multiply synchronically, despite the powerful mathematical system that produces them. The reason is that mathematical systems are not parts of a natural language; they are only served by the language system, just like any other science, in order to communicate what a person, a mathematician for example, wishes to communicate, using English, French or Tagalog. Mathematical systems belong to science, the same as botanical taxonomy does not make part of language, even if it uses language for its purposes.

We can appreciate the diachronicity of adding numbers by the following example:

I know the English word for the mathematical notion of 1,000,000 (million); I also know the words billion (mathematical 1,000,000,000) and trillion (1,000,000,000,000). But here I must stop. I can write the next multiplication, 1,000,000,000,000,000, but I have no English word for it -- in my synchronic system of language this scientific concept has no name, hence does not exist. I may invent a name, or ask someone whose language does possess it, and learn it. This development in my linguistic system is a micro-historical event, broadening my previous system.

For the concept of the system as closed by definition, see above, 4.1.1.

9.1.4 Analysis and Generation. As presented above (7.1), all understanding of man and nature requires analysis. Nothing around us is given to us in portioned, isolated particles, but rather in unanalyzed wholes, small or big.

Modern linguistics and modern psychology have mostly somehow recognized this and, pushing this to its logical conclusion, Hjelmslev (1961) posited the beginning-point of analysis at the highest whole possible -- the bulk of all texts of all languages -- in order to gradually "descend" to smaller and smaller elements.


Yet, as we know, man's nature seems to favor the reverse procedure, synthesis, apparently because of the security one feels in dealing with given, defined elements.

Some American linguists, notably Z. S. Harris, (1951), took the synthetic approach, either tacitly assuming previous analysis or ignoring its necessity. Chomsky, raised in that tradition, absorbed synthesis and, as we shall see, brought it into his own method, generation (1957). In this method the grammar is not a description of a language, but a way of (re-)generating its sentences, a reconstruction of what exists. The logic behind this is that the best proof of understanding is in the doing: if one can reconstruct a sentence, one can be sure to possess an explicit knowledge of its workings.

Now, is generation analytic or synthetic?

The question never arises with Chomsky himself. Indeed, generation seems to pertain to neither direction. When it rewrites the abstract S(entence) as its constitutive parts, it neither analyzes it (because it does not yet exist in full) nor synthesizes it (because the

constituents too emerge only in the course of generation). The following is a "tree" diagram showing (simplified) generation of a typical sentence:



(Cf. Bach, 1964).

We may find some assistance in what Chomsky wrote at the beginning of his Syntactic Structures (1957), characterizing his grammar as "A device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under analysis". Did he mean that the "production" (i. e. the generation) is itself the procedure of analysis? This does not seem likely. If it was, analysis would acquire here a sense very different from ours. There remains the possibility that production of sentences is to be done on the basis of some prior analysis, thereby coming to know the elements to be used in the production. Generation is thus a use or a presentation of previously gained analytical knowledge, and in that sense it cannot but be synthetic. Its quality would now ===== depend on the quality of the analysis performed.

What kind of analysis is performed by Chomsky or his followers prior to generation? No explicit answer to this can be given, since Chomsky refuses to refer to any "discovery procedures". These, as we know, constituted a great part of American Structuralist methodology, and their rigidity brought about Chomsky's reaction: as a true

rationalist, he is contemptuous of any attempt to teach researchers how to investigate or how to think, thought being a creative, spontaneous process:

Just as the proof of a mathematical theorem can be checked without taking account of the way in which the person constructing the proof happened to hit upon the relevant intermediate propositions, so it should be with respect to grammatical analysis (Lyons, 1970, p. 41).

Social scientists tend to have inferiority feelings concerning mathematics. But let us not be overwhelmed by them. Mathematics is a discipline dealing with human ratio, whereas linguistics is (or has tried to be) an account of a social institution, whose phenomena should be recorded and described. It cannot, should not, stay within the mind of the researcher. And work-procedures are needed in all empirical disciplines in order to ensure control of interfering variables, of which the most dangerous is the wishful thinking of the scientist himself.

One side of the ban on discovery procedures in Chomsky's work has been a general displeasure with empirical evidence itself. This promoted the use of unreal, fabricated and contextless examples, employed as data in generative grammars just as in logic books (which can afford to do this, as they do not deal with natural languages), or in Medieval Speculative Grammar. Naturally, fabricated examples tend to prove the contentions of their author.

The other side of doing the necessary analysis without specifying how, is this. As Chomsky knows all too well (Ruwet, 1968), the human mind works in accordance with models, never in purely free thought processes. Children, as Jaspers said, at first draw what they know rather than what they see. In linguistics, the unfortunate result

of avoiding discovery procedures is that we fall back on half-scientific models of analysis, learned in school -- traditional, mainly Aristotelian grammar, with all its faults. No wonder that Chomsky feels such affinity with this kind of grammar (Chomsky, 1964) -- he has really never left its domain.

Essentially, then, what generativists do is recycle that popular, admittedly heterogeneous and inconsistent model, feeding it into the latest mathematical devices.

The sophistication of the device proved somewhat frightening yet attractive for many linguists; and, when on finally "cracking" the mathematical machinery they discover the familiar school grammar, they simply fall in love with Chomskyan revolution: nice as an old glove, yet beautifully refurbished.

Even more unfortunate is the assumption that the necessary analysis is all supplied in the existing grammars. It shuts the door against any substantial innovative thinking, leaving room only for presentational and notational niceties.

One basic, inherited insufficiency is the $S \rightarrow NP + VP$ rule, representing a common sentence pattern in English and other Indo-European languages, but on no account universal. For example, French has the pattern Voilà le roi! ("Here (is) the King!") or, with a pronoun, Me voilà! ("Here I (am)!", literally "Me here!"). Even the familiar English has The more the better and No wonder he is sad, etc. Where is the Verb Phrase in these well formed sentences? The same question applies to a good number of sentence patterns in less well-known languages, e. g. Greek, Hebrew, or Coptic (Barri, 1977a).

The generative method has brought about the problem of grammaticality. Since the grammar is no longer a description of findings, but rather an active production device of all and only the well-formed sentences of the language, there arises the problem of how to distinguish "well-formed" or "grammatical" from "ungrammatical". In descriptive grammar it is assumed that every utterance that is attested in a text is worth describing, since it has been used for communication. For the same reason, only attested utterances (not fabricated) are described. This is called a corpus.

But Chomsky, impressed by the "creativity of language" (above, 9.1.3) insisted that a corpus of data would not do justice to all the new sentences that are uttered all the time, or are at least possible. That was one reason for the generative method. Now a generative grammar could be "too strong", in that it would pour out every kind of word combination. The function of the requirement of grammaticality is to restrict the activity of the grammar to the domain of grammatical sentences.

Grammaticality was thought at first (Lees, 1957) to be an easy judgment, made by every native speaker of the language according to his linguistic intuition. It proved to be a hopelessly difficult matter:

A particular generative grammar of the sort that Chomsky describes will... predict that certain utterances are grammatical and others are ungrammatical. Lees says that such prediction can be tested directly against speakers' intuitions of grammaticality. But others (including Chomsky) are dubious about this sort of direct test. Speakers can to some extent distinguish "deviant" from "nondeviant" utterances,... i. e. "judgments of acceptability". But it is not clear that speakers can intuitively distinguish between ungrammaticality and other kinds of deviance. Is Chomsky's example Colorless green ideas sleep furiously grammatically deviant? or semantically or logically deviant? People have disagreed about this, and, as Partee notes, Chomsky has changed his mind twice about this example. (Harman, 1974 p. viii).

Note that clearcut judgments of grammaticality are essential for users of the generative method. A sentence is either grammatical, hence generable by the grammar, or not. As generativists begin to see now, grammaticality may involve different dimensions of acceptability (semantic, syntactic or pragmatic, etc.) and even degrees of acceptability, which, for the purposes of a generative grammar, is as good as saying that someone is just a little bit pregnant...

One valuable point in the generation (to some extent taken over from Harris (1951) but further developed) is the gradual passage from one stage of generation to the next, without too many preconceived "levels" of analysis (syntactic, morphological, phonemic, etc). Among other things, this means renouncing of the unscientific unit of word, a traditional stumbling block in the way of any analysis.

9.1.5 Speaker Orientation.

In #8 above I suggested the idea that the linguist is by definition a passive listener in the circuit of speech events, in much the same way as the phenomenological psychologist. In order to examine Chomsky's standing in this matter let us be reminded of his former characterization of his grammar as "a device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under analysis (above, #9.1.4). Lyons (1970) seems unhappy about the wording:

It is unfortunate, however, that Chomsky has used the word "produce" in the passage... It almost inevitably suggests that the grammatical structure of the language is being described from the point of view of the speaker rather than the listener; that the grammar describes the production, and not the reception, of speech... But Chomsky has continually warned us against identifying the "production" of sentences within the grammar with the production of sentences by the speaker of a language. The grammar is intended to be neutral as between production and reception, to a certain extent explaining both, but no more biased toward one than it is toward the other. (p. 43-4).

In 1977, I had the following to say about this:

It is clear that the generative derivation of a sentence, starting with the semantic component and going down to phonetics can only be taken to parallel the activity of the speaker. Generation may well have been meant by Chomsky to be used merely as a mathematical way of representation, but in language the proceeding from thought to speech is rightly understood by most linguists, despite Generative protests, as speaker-oriented. Worse, the users of such a method of mere representation must eventually become themselves prisoners of their "neutral" model, starting inadvertently to use it as a full model of speaker's behaviour. Thus Chomsky and Halle seem positively incapable of describing perception in natural hearer's terms: their account of language perception is precisely a model of production, absurdly forced on the hearer (Chomsky & Halle, 1968 p. 24)

What Chmsky & Halle tried to do in 1968 was to describe the hearer as someone who, upon hearing a message, generates a sentence, and compares it to the one he has heard; if it does not fit, he modifies it gradually, by continually generating sentences to match the one just heard, until there is perfect matching. Then he knows that he understands what was said to him (!)

Characteristically Ruwet (1968), after reproaching various writers for taking generation for production, slips and equates Chomskyan grammar with normative (i. e. speaker's instruction) traditional grammars:

Let us note also that, seen this way, but with an important qualification, this part of the program of a generative grammar does not differ from the program... that traditional grammars had: ... render its reader capable of forming correctly the grammatical sentences of the language. The qualification is that a traditional grammar is far from being explicit (p. 33; translation mine).

Ruwet's paragraph brings up one interesting by-product of the speaker orientation -- "correctness" or prescriptivism in grammar. American Structuralists, as Lyons (1970) notes,

were very conscious of the need to distinguish clearly between the descriptive and prescriptive (or normative) grammar: between the description of the rules that are actually followed

by the native speakers and the prescription of rules that, in the opinion of the grammarian, they ought to follow, in order to speak "correctly"... So concerned were the "Bloomfieldians" (and various other "schools") with asserting the status of linguistics as a descriptive science that they made it a point of principle not to venture any judgment about the grammaticality or "correctness" of sentences,... (pp. 36-7).

Judgment of grammaticality, as we said (9.1.4), are absolutely necessary in Chomsky's grammar. True, he tried to rely not on traditional "correctness" but rather on the speaker's intuition about "well-formedness". Yet no one can really say what is the basis for those (often conflicting) judgments. Lyons (1970), discussing Chomsky's "idealization of raw data", admits:

It might appear that Chomsky is here guilty of the confusion between description and prescription that was so common in traditional grammar. But this is not so. ... There are, of course, serious problems, both practical and theoretical, involved... and it may well be that, in practice, the "idealization" of the data... does tend to introduce some of the normative considerations that marred much of traditional grammar. But this does not affect the general principle (pp. 38-9).

Or does it? For me, the only solution for the "serious practical and theoretical problems" is no less than giving up completely the speaker's point of view, remaining in the role of the observer-hearer which is natural for empirical sciences. True, this is a relatively humble position for the scientist, and has the effect of partly disregarding his fine rational mind; hopefully, it can help establish some objective, replicable results.

At this point some readers might query: Isn't Adlerian psychology a value approach to human life? Has not Adler posited the value of social interest as a supreme measure of mental health? why not a value approach to linguistics?

The answer is: Adlerians have values about human purposes - about adjustment and cooperation among people. The specific behaviors, as long as they are in line with these purposes and promote them, are not judged good or bad. Language only consists of such specific behaviors. It can have no purpose of its own, since it is not an organism (above, #0). Language only serves the purposes of its users. Their most common goal is to communicate. Now communication is beautifully assured in saying It's me rather than It is I (the "correct" form), in spite of normativists' claims. That is all that is needed.

9.1.6 Future Perspective for Generative Grammar.

Chomsky's revolution is now in an interesting process of disintegration. Philosophically inclined linguists are transferring the discussion of Transformational-Generative Grammar into the domains of pure Semantics, Logic or Pragmatics (e. g. Harman, 1974); more language-oriented scholars have started to go back to describing linguistic phenomena, rather than the mind behind them. For many, what has stayed is Chomskyan terminology alone, or his presentation methods of sentences -- external vestiges of a recently conquering trend.

This is the outcome of an accumulated disenchantment with Chomskyan thinking, expressed over the years by a number of obstinates (e. g. Hockett, 1967; Matthews, 1967; Uhlenbeck, 1973; Robinson, 1975; also Barri, 1975a, 1977, 1978). The linguistic pendulum starts now to go back in the direction of empirical observation. Conceivably, after the dust of the battles settles, it will reach its goal.

Other disciplines, among them psychology, are still feasting on the prestigious "linguistic findings" supplied by Chomsky. These "extra-linguistic territories" may one day find themselves the only Chomskyan stronghold, as even Lyons envisages:

Even if it were decided eventually that none of Chomsky's work on generative grammar was of any direct relevance to the description of natural languages, it would still be judged valuable by logicians and mathematicians, who are concerned with the construction and study of formal systems independently of their empirical application. (1970, p. 124).

9.2 Lévi-Strauss

In this country French structuralism has been mostly connected with the name of the social anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, whereas Saussure is not mentioned beyond the pages of linguistic journals. We should therefore devote a few pages to clarify his standing to Saussure's ideas.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (L-S) was born in 1908 in Belgium, studied law in Paris and read the masters of sociology of that time -- Saint Simon, Comte, Durkheim. From 1934 to 1937 he was professor of sociology in São Paulo, Brazil, where he decided to make a trip along the Amazon and thus came to have some five months' field experience among the Indians. From 1941 to 1945 he worked in New York, where he met the Russian-American linguist, Roman Jakobson, who influenced his thinking with his special blend of Saussurianism, Russian Formalist Poetics and Prague-Circle phonology (See Sec. 5), and his own theory of universal, binary acoustic traits that build up every sound in language. (Jakobson & Halle, 1956, cf. 9.2.5. His indebtedness to structural linguistics was so great, that he considered his field and method to belong to semiology (or semiotics) -- the science of signs, suggested by Saussure as an overall discipline whose most well-known representative was language. He compared the Saussurean Revolution to the Copernician one and linguistics itself to the exact natural sciences (Koerner, 1973, 220 n.4; 399-400; Culler, 1976, 100-101). Some technical features, such as the syntagmatic (L-S: "metonymic") and paradigmatic ("metaphoric"; cf. Sec. 6.) coordinates have also been taken over from structural linguistics.

Yet L-S's brand of structuralism seems, upon investigation, to be significantly different from Saussure's or Hjelmslev's. His scientific

temperament reflected what he has called his "three great loves": geology, psychoanalysis and marxism. In the heated arguments with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, subject to additions from both marxist and psychoanalytical theories, his ethnographic studies became a fashionable philosophy, like Sartre's existentialism, for the intellectual salon-communists and coffee-house-psychoanalysts. In this kind of milieu it lost its methodological character, and became a kind of literature and estheticism (Koerner, 1973: 353, n. 21; Leach, 1974, pp. 7-8; Piaget, 1970).

It is interesting to read Edmund Leach's book about L-S (1974), to see how a British ethnographer raised in Malinowskian functionalism (a position not far from Saussurean thinking, and which gave rise to the work of J. R. Firth, a quasi-Saussurean) treats Lévi-Straussian anthropology with admiration yet disbelief. For our purpose we shall cite heavily from this book, but limit ourselves to points that touch directly on structural method, rather than on anthropology.

9.2.1. Anti-Synchronism.

First, L-S holds that all semiological work is comparative, be it in space, between societies, or in time, historically. He thus shuns Saussure's basic tenet of synchronic, non-comparative study of the state-of-language in a given moment. L-S maintains that history lives in the historian's mind contemporaneously, and that myth is timeless, as are primitive societies, which are "without history" (Koerner, 1973: 307 n. 27; Leach, 1974, pp. 8-9). What L-S really means is that primitive societies with no writing have no

consciousness of history, just as myth uses elements of different periods.

But the anthropologist or linguist has a different perspective: a myth changes through time, as well as institutions and customs. Scientists cannot afford to neglect the time factor as do the aborigines. Timelessness for L-S means also that the structures of primitive thought are present in our modern minds just as much as they are in the minds of those who belong to the "societies without history" (Leach, 1974, p. 9):

Unlike the history of the historians, history as the geologist and the psychoanalyst sees it is intended to body forth in time--rather in the manner of a tableau vivant--certain fundamental properties of the physical and psychical universe (L-S, Tristes Tropiques, cited in Leach, 1974, pp. 10-11).

9.2.2. Universalism.

Anti-synchronism has thus brought L-S very naturally to a position of universalist "fundamental properties", which go so well with psychoanalytic and Jungian phylogenetic forces and collective unconscious:

When an anthropologist sets out to compare...Australian Aborigines... Eskimos or...the English he is first of all impressed by the differences. Yet since all cultures are the product of human brains, there must be, somewhere beneath the surface, features that are common to all (Leach, 1974, p. 22).

Like Chomsky, L-S has taken over from Jakobson his binary method of distinctions (See 9.2.5.), and, although Chomsky has some contempt for L-S's work (Chomsky, 1964, p. 67), they seem rather similar:

The characteristics of Chomsky's linguistics...have many points in common with the generative and transformational rules for myth analysis which Lévi-Strauss developed on his own quite independently (Leach, 1974: 23 n. 3).

Both L-S and Chomsky posit innate, universal structural characteristics of the human brain, to be found as a "deep structure" beneath the differences -- a position wholly opposed to Saussure's arbitrary sign and relativist view of systems.

9.2.3 Rationalism.

Chomsky's contempt of "data-oriented linguistics" or of taxonomies is a facsimile of Leach's (1974) remark:

It is the constant refrain of Lévi-Strauss and his close disciples that all his Anglo-Saxon critics, the present author included, are crude empiricists. Empiricism here seems to mean the doctrine that truth must be verifiable by reference to observable facts; it stands opposed to "rationalism", which reaches to a deeper form of truth by means of operations of the intellect (43 n. 6).

Like Chomsky with his fabricated examples (See 9.1.4), L-S was sharply criticized for the quality of his field work or data. His five months among the Brazilian Indians are counted by ethnographers as rather little experience:

He is insufficiently critical of his source material. He always seems to be able to find just what he is looking for. Any evidence, however dubious, is acceptable so long as it fits with logically calculated expectations....So we need to remember that Lévi-Strauss' prime training was in philosophy and in law; he consistently behaves like an advocate defending a cause rather than a scientist searching for ultimate truth (Leach, 1974, p. 13).

For example, L-S has maintained that incest-taboo is universal, which Leach (1974, p. 45) expressly denies.

9.2.4. Conflict in Myth.

Methodologically,

Lévi-Strauss on myth has much the same fascination as Freud on the interpretation of dreams, and the same kind of weaknesses too. A first encounter with Freud is usually persuasive; it is all so neat, it simply ~~must~~ be right. But then you begin to wonder. Supposing the whole Freudian argument about symbolic associations and layers of conscious, unconscious, and preconscious were entirely false, would it ever be possible to prove that it is false? And if the answer to that question is "No," you then have to ask yourself whether psychoanalytic arguments about symbol formation and free association can ever be anything better than clever talk (Leach, 1974, p. 57).

This is because Lévi-Strauss' ultimate concern is with the "unconscious nature of collective phenomena" (L-S, 1963, p. 18); "he assumes with Freud that a myth is a kind of collective dream and that it should be capable of interpretation so as to reveal the hidden meaning" (Leach, 1974, p. 61).

Like a dream for Freud, a myth for L-S is the resolution of a conflict:

Collectively the sum of what all the myths say...is a necessary poetic truth which is an unwelcome contradiction....The function of mythology is to exhibit publicly, though in disguise, ordinarily unconscious paradoxes (Leach, 1974, pp. 77-78).

Myths would thus express unconscious wishes which are somehow inconsistent with conscious experience, like (a) wishing to keep the women in the clan (incest), yet having to hand them over to allies in order to buy their cooperation (exogamy): (b) that life entails the concept of death; (c) that cooked food is a product of culture, yet has its source in nature, etc. (See Leach, 1974, pp. 61-62; 77-78).

This dreamlike, conflictual view of myths stands in contrast to the anthropologist's current view that "myth is a sacred tale" (Leach, 1974, p. 58) or Durkheim's "mythologies are expressions of classification systems", a "first

philosophy of nature" (See Giddens, 1979, p. 95-96). These two views find a continuation in Powers' view of myth as a "cultural early recollection" (1973). Both L-S and Powers generalize from an individual phenomenon to a group culture; yet they differ in their presentations just as Freudian theory differs from Adlerian thinking. For Powers, myth "serves (and expresses) the unity and uniqueness of a culture just as memory serves (and expresses) the unity and uniqueness of a life style" (1973, p. 284). Or, for the classicists and anthropologists that he cites, "A myth is the expression of a fundamental mental attitude to life. For that reason, every social class has myths of its own" (Jaeger); "a large, controlling image that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of ordinary life; that is, which has organizing value for experience" (Schorer); "it expresses, enhances and codifies belief" (Malinowski). All these view myth essentially as a guide, whereas L-S, after Freud, views it as an unconscious compromise between two conflicting forces, a device for easing pressure.

9.2.5. Binarism vs. Relevance.

Let us go back now to Saussure's oppositions or Prague-School relevance (See Sec. 5). Its echo in L-S's work is an ethnographic adaptation of Jakobson & Halle (1956), based on binary acoustic features.

Actually acoustic features are everything but binary, for they represent wave lengths, which are continuous. Apparently L-S liked the enormous simplicity of binarism and applied it to anthropology, e.g., in the title of his famous book, The Raw and the Cooked (1969).

What is worse, from a Saussurean point of view, is that the binary system is universal, hence phonetic, rather than phonemic or particular to one language system. This is a step backward from Saussure's (and also from Jakobson's) work on relevance in a specific system. The eagerness with which both L-S and Chomsky made use of binarism is a good indicator for their divorce from Saussurean methodology.

9.3 Piaget

Jean Piaget is an especially interesting figure for the purpose of this paper, since he is at the same time a psychologist and an author of a well-known book about Structuralism (1968, English 1971) that tries to summarize the European structuralist scene in all branches of science.

For Piaget, "The notion of structure is comprised of three key ideas: the idea of wholeness, the idea of transformation, and the idea of self regulation"(1971, p. 5).

For me, these three are indeed the main problems of structuralism; they certainly do not constitute keys for being a structure. Of the three, wholeness would be accepted by Saussure, the Gestaltists and other structuralists. Transformation, on the other hand, is a definitely diachronic concept that Piaget introduces, presumably under the influence of Lévi-Strauss and of Chomsky (above, Secs. 9.1, 9.2). Piaget is a developmental psychologist, and it is clear that for him synchrony, Saussure's paramount contribution, is not really interesting:

The really central problem of structuralism: Have these composite wholes always been composed?...Did not someone compound them? (1971, p. 9).

Piaget rejects the abstract "atemporality of some structuralists", but on the other hand knows well that an exact factual account of the genesis of a structure is impossible. So he dwells on transformations, or "equilibrations" (1971, p. 11), within the structure, to account for its recent stabilization. He knows that for Saussure this would be the diachronic process culminating in a certain state of language, never a trait of the system itself; so he reasons (1971, pp. 10-11) that systems are not immovable anyhow, and that this view should be a necessary development of Saussure's thinking (which I strongly doubt).

The third idea connected with structure, according to Piaget, would be self-regulation. This seems sound enough, granted that "Structures are closed and autonomous wholes" (1971, p. 61). Yet the idea again seems to involve regulatory changes within the system (which for Saussureans would again be diachronic). What Piaget seems to miss here is Saussure's distinction between a (temporarily) immovable system -- la langue, somewhat like a printed computer program -- and the process that the system is responsible for -- la parole, roughly the computer's output. In this sense, there is no regulating within any system. The same applies to sociology: imagine a sociometric structure (langue) responsible for and yielding a sociogram (parole). The moment the structure changes, it must, if tried, yield an already different sociogram. It is another structure. This is already a diachronic change.

Or take the structure of a legal system. On a long term basis it might be described as self-regulating, taking into account its feedbacks and changes.

But at any given "synchronic" moment no regulation takes place; we have to deal only with the system of the laws that are valid at a certain moment. Operating on the basis of a law that will come into force next month would not be legal today.

Piaget really knows all this, when he remarks that

Saussure's structuralism, unlike the "transformational" structuralism of Chomsky and Harris today, was in essence synchronic (1971, p. 77).

He then goes on to say that language and economics, being value-systems, must indeed be described synchronically. Granted this,

It is extremely interesting that, despite the very strong arguments for keeping linguistic structuralism within synchronic confines, present-day linguistic structuralism, as represented by the work of Zellig S. Harris and, above all, his pupil Noam Chomsky, has, as regards syntax, a clearly "generative" orientation (Piaget, 1971, p. 87).

This "striking change of perspective" is linked to "The fascinating mix of geneticism and Cartesianism characteristic of Chomsky" (1971, p. 87) and which Piaget ultimately rejects (1971, pp. 87-96).

What remains to be asked is why Piaget includes Chomsky in structuralism, despite his dislike for, and desertion of, that movement. It is my impression that Piaget, like so many Francophone intellectuals, has imbibed his structuralism from Lévi-Strauss, whose work is so different from his master's, Saussure. And being essentially a psychologist, Piaget is sometimes in no position to grasp the consequences of a development within linguistics, as when he mistakenly regards Jakobson's binary features, which are phonetic (i.e., of a universal substance-discipline not pertaining to any specific system) as the "further refinement" of Troubetzkoy's declaredly one-system phonology (Piaget, 1971, p. 80). An even worse lack of comprehension is shown by the following

discussion of Hjelmslev's equivalents of langue and parole: "For any given process there is a hidden system, process itself being the transition from one to another system (1971: 80 n. 6). For Hjelmslev as for Saussure, the process (parole) is the output attributed to one, and only one, system (langue), never a transformation between systems. Hjelmslev's book (1961) is hard reading, but this part of it is really elementary. Piaget, therefore, is as distant a "friend of Saussure" as Lévi-Strauss is.

9.4 Freud

Many who know something about both Freud and Adler tend to see their similarities and overlook the fundamental theoretical gap between them (the Ansbachers, in Adler, 1964, pp. 3-4). What is even stranger is to encounter people who do not know Adler's work, and who attribute to Freud those very opinions that are the essence of the Adlerian thinking.

9.4.1 Socialness and Ahistoricism?

Jonathan Culler, an expert on European structuralism and an author of a book on Saussure (1977), was so impressed by the contemporaneity of Saussure (1857-1913), Durkheim (1858-1917) and Freud (1856-1939) that he developed a theory about the basic similarities of these three masters:

When studying human behavior the investigator cannot simply dismiss as subjective impressions the meaning behavior has for members of a society. Moreover, Saussure, Freud and Durkheim saw that the study of human behavior misses its best opportunities if it tries to trace the historical causes of individual events. Instead, it must focus

primarily on the functions which events have within a general social framework (Culler, 1977, p. xiv).

Culler spells out Freud's alleged social orientation and his "move away from historical explanation" (1977, p. 77). Curiously enough, for him Freud's work on the Oedipus complex is "the most striking example for this displacement", because, even though Freud postulated a historical event in primitive times, "he admits it is possible that the original deed never actually took place; remorse may have been provoked by the son's fantasy of killing the father" (Culler, 1977, pp. 78-79). What Culler does not elucidate is the phylogenetic and universal connection with that distant origin that Freud maintained to be active for every generation, presumably through a collective unconscious. Culler would rather see Freud "in the guise of an eighteenth-century thinker, using fictions of origin to discuss the nature of a thing" (1977, p. 79).

As I see it, Culler's eulogy of socialness and of non-historism is true for Saussure and Durkheim; his view of Freud is a simple wishful thinking. Had he known Adler's work, he might have found a truer champion of social and synchronic forces.

9.4.2 Substance Orientation.

Beyond those, Freud's most flagrant dissimilarity with both Saussure and Adler is about form vs. substance, or systemicity. As we saw above (Sec. 2.1.1.) for Saussure everything in language is "form, not substance" (1959, p. 113 et passim) and linguistic elements are identifiable only by their relations (Hjelmslev, 1961).

Freud shows rudiments of such a conception, in speaking about the relative power of, for example, the three "structures" -- Id, Ego, Superego; or the relative "coverage" of the three "topoi" -- consciousness, subconscious, and unconscious. Contents may be "brought up" to consciousness by the "elevators" of free association or dream, etc. But as a whole, Freud writes about entities, objects, rather than interplay of relative system-parts. And his notion of the libido as a concrete hydraulic system has been much criticised. Irvin D. Yalom describes his own disillusionment with this part of Freud's thinking:

It is only when therapists look deeply at their techniques and at their basic view of man that they discover, usually to their surprise, that they are existentially oriented. Most dynamically oriented therapists...inwardly eschew or at best inattend to much of the fundamental, mechanistic analytic theory. Classical psychoanalytic theory is based quite explicitly on a specific, highly materialistic view of man's nature (1975, p. 85).

The view that Yalom has in mind is Helmholtz's doctrine of the explanation of phenomena in medicine by the physical-mathematical method exclusively. A. Y. Napier, the family systems theorist, describes so well the nature of the substance transformations in Freud's work:

The intricacies of how the mind dealt with these polarities within its own system preoccupied Freud for the remainder of his career, and his elaboration of the defenses, the fancy footwork which the mind must perform as it steps delicately between innate desire and social conformity, remains perhaps his most brilliant achievement (1978, p. 40).

All this stands in sharp contrast with Adler's work, where most content details do not get mentioned much, except in examples, and never raised to the status of permanent parts of the theory. Content or substance is relegated to the status of "private", specific material that is accountable by the specific conditions of living and the creativity of the individual, subject to the

all-dictating style of life, in itself a form, not content (Shulman, 1973, p. 18, Life Style as causa formalis; For substance in Chomsky's work, see above, Sec. 9.1.1.

Adler was so sparing in treating the different individual neuroses or the content of symptoms that even Adlerians today are tempted to some extent to use some of Freud's detailed reification with their mythological appellations. The convenience of using ready-made references such as Electra-Complex, ego-strength, intellectualization, oral, female-symbol, etc., resembles that of using standard psychiatric diagnoses. They are both characterized by a "synthetic" (above, Secs. 7.1) terminology which seems much easier for us than the holistic, relativistic description that Adler, the idiographer, recommended. The tendency also exemplifies Adler's phenomenology contrasted with Freud's naive introspection (See Section 8.2.)

Conclusion

In 1907 Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) started, in his course of General Linguistics at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, a wholly new approach to the understanding and analysis of languages. Perhaps under the influence of his contemporary, Emile Durkheim, Saussure took the socialness of language to be the cornerstone of his view and launched a number of basic dichotomies to help isolate the relevant subject-matter of his science. These were the distinctions of signifier vs. signified within the sign; langue vs. parole; synchrony vs. diachrony, and the syntagmatic vs associative (or paradigmatic) planes of analysis. They all served as building blocks in the theory of language as a system of relations, where linguistic elements have no "objective" significance or existence of their own; they only "exist" as elements by force of social conventions within a given language community. This abstract systemic structure of relations was the reason for the name Structuralism.

Language, in spite of its complexity and evasiveness, is a fairly stable human institution that can be fixed by writing for purposes of research. As European linguistic structuralism gained ground, its prestige carried its ideas to the other human sciences - sociology, literature, ethnography. As it often happens, these ideas changed form on the way. Their relational, abstract nature made them particularly vulnerable to misunderstanding, sometimes to the

point of no recognition. This is how it came about that famous "Structuralists" like Claude Lévi-Strauss or Jean Piaget have so little in common with Saussure.

American Structural linguistics was different in many ways from Saussurean linguistics. Among other things, because of its (blessed) encounter with the "exotic" Amerindian languages, and because of the influence of Behaviorism and of a practical "cookbook" approach. Yet the main concerns of the two structuralisms were similar.

Eventually, the "cookbook" method met its antithesis in the form of a highly theoretical, mathematically-minded Generativism. Its advent played down many of the Structural achievements before they could ripen to a comprehensive view of the nature of language. The newcoming Generativism, on the other hand, had a powerful mathematical apparatus, but refused to use empirical research, so that it fell back on rationalist speculations, no less dogmatic than its Structural predecessor. (America, this great continent, seems liable to dogmatism by its own gigantic uniformity: nowhere in the world is there such a vast number of people of the same country, language and educational system, all wishing to be in on the latest scientific advances.)

In another realm, Alfred Adler published his first book in what may be called "social Psychiatry" in the same year that Saussure began teaching his course. Influenced by many social and humanistic thinkers, of whom Durkheim might have been one, he too was struck with the centrality of the socialness of man and by

the systemic, holistic structure, both of his environment of other people and of his own personality. To these Adler added man's purposefulness and the necessary core of "fictions" that every individual seems to carry. As with Saussure, these assumptions served to build a model of man as a non-objective, relational being - "relational" in the sense of giving value to each interpersonal experience or each part of himself not on the basis of things "as they are", but on how they look to him through some personal fictions, his subjective world-view. This personal core, alias the life style of the person, parallels the concept of the Saussurean langue, the encoded part of the language as opposed to the open, decoded behavior, the parole.

Again, Adler's ideas were extensively borrowed, even if rarely acknowledged. Sometimes they underwent distortions, so that their purport seems very different from Adler's thinking. Walter O'Connell (1976) has called this "the 'friends of Adler' phenomenon".

Saussure's **S**tructuralism and Adler's holistic psychology are described in this paper as belonging to the same kind of human science, presupposing the same model of man. They have fought the same battle, which ultimately is the battle for a relative, pluralistic attitude to the variety of human individual entities. In this variety and in the uniqueness of every person and every language I discern the real human creativity.

I have often been impressed with the craving for universalism shown by so many philosophers, logicians, linguists and psychologists. It denotes, for me, an apprehension before the unknown or

unaccustomed, a "No" to pluriformism and pluralism. As if only what is like ourselves is worth seeking, investigating, and, ultimately, crediting with worth similar to our own. For me, modern human science is exactly the flight from such egocentrism (or ethnocentrism). Yet the above tendency is so deeply rooted in human thinking (as is all group cohesiveness) that it crops up again just as a Saussure or an Adler tries to do away with it.

Language, because it is a product of humans rather than any part of them, seems easier to conceptualize and formalize. This means that Adlerian psychology can learn from achievements in linguistics, especially from the methods of investigation and from the truths arrived at by pushing principles to their logical limits, as Hjelmslev (1961) did with concepts of analysis. On the other hand, linguistics too can gain from Adler's psychology a better understanding of the uniqueness of man.

This paper tries to begin this kind of useful learning, and at the same time to locate Adler as a central thinker of European Structuralism.

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